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RETHINKING THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S APPROACH
TO COLLECTIVE SELF-IMPROVEMENT: COMPETENCE
AND THE CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE
BRYANT G. GARTH*
To be an eminent barrister, a man must be 'a scholar and a gen-
tleman'. . . . The members of the bar form one of the most brilliant
sections of society; and he who would be of it must be fit for it. He must
have the best possible education at school and college; and, at both, the
embryo barrister should train his powers of speech at debating societies
connected therewith. He should by all means try to graduate from Ox-
ford or Cambridge.**
There is a single word to characterize the single dominant issue [for the
legal profession] in the 1980's. . . . That word is competence.***
It is difficult to dissent from the enthusiasm with which the le-
gal profession recently has taken up the issue of lawyers' compe-
tence.' No one with any practical experience would deny the superfi-
* B.A. 1972, Yale University; J.D. 1975, Stanford University; Ph.D. (European
Doctorate) 1979, European University Institute (Florence). Associate Professor, Indiana
University School of Law (Bloomington). I would like to thank Professors Eugene Gaetke,
Edwin Greenebaum, William Popkin, Deborah L. Rhode, and Lee Teitelbaum for very
helpful criticisms and comments.
** JACK'S REFERENCE BOOK 750 (1910).
* David R. Brink, President of the American Bar Association, reported in 67 A.B.A.
J. 264 (1981).
1. Among the more thoughtful discussions of lawyer competence in civil cases are: Carl-
son, Measuring the Quality of Legal Services: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 11 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 287 (1976); Cort & Sammons, The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and
Model of Lawyering Competencies, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397 (1980); Cramton, Lawyer Compe-
tence and the Law Schools, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1981); Martyn, Lawyer Competence
and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 Gno. L.J. 705 (1981); Rosenthal, Evaluating the
Competence of Lawyers, 11 LAw & Soc'y REv. 257 (1976); Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978); and Trakman, Competence in the Law:
An Unending Search, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 401 (1982).
The judicial pronouncements that helped precipitate the current debate include
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973); Burger, The Special
Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our Sys-
tem of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973); Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court,
60 A.B.A. J. 175 (1974). For a contrary view, see Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence:
Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613 (1977).
The leading reports in response to the judicial concern are published in the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Ad-
mission to Practice in the Federal Courts, 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979); Advisory Committee on Pro-
posed Rules for Admission to Practice, Qualifications for Practice Before the United Stats
Courts in the Second Circuit, 67 F.R.D. 159 (1975); ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
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ciality and shoddiness of much legal work, nor would anyone claim
that the bar's institutions of quality control have provided effective
means of self-regulation in the past. 2 Furthermore, from one per-
spective, a lawyer's most fundamental ethical duty is "compe-
tence," because the guarantee of competence is what justifies the
professional monopoly. The adversary system is built on the as-
sumption that each side's position will be represented effectively by
a trained legal advocate. Upgrading legal services appears to be in
everybody's interests.
This article, nevertheless, suggests a rethinking of the emerging
consensus. It will argue that the bar's current concern has little to
commend itself as the issue of the 1980's. We should pay attention to
the quality of legal services, but the leaders of the bar thus far have
approached this concern too narrowly. Their approach leads at best
to a distraction from an understanding of important recent changes
in the legal profession. At worst, successful "reforms" justified in the
name of improving competence could undermine or negate recent
trends that have bolstered the position of consumers of legal ser-
vices. Too much "competence," defined strictly as collective self-
improvement, will undermine client choice and the accessibility of
legal services.
Part I of this article explores briefly the problems of docu-
menting incompetence and defining competence, showing the recent
emergence of new attempts to find a single objective measure of pro-
fessional performance. Accordingly, the collective upgrading pro-
grams now being discussed by the legal profession tend to favor the
imposition of high performance standards across all sectors of clients
and legal practices. All practitioners, it seems, are supposed to per-
form at the level of corporate lawyers with deep pocket clients. It
takes little analysis to see that there are real costs connected with
the pursuit of uniform high quality.
Part II explores how competence came to be the issue of the
1980's, and shows the likely futility of any efforts to make compe-
tence the paramount value in professional regulation. Some reasons
for these efforts relate to skepticism about the quality of the profes-
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER
COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979); ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTINU-
ING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS: THE REPORT ON
THE HOUSTON CONFERENCE (1981) [hereinafter cited as ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF
LAWYERS]; A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMONT, THE QUALITY O ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1978). See also infra notes 34-35.
2. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession, Is it Self Regula-
tion?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193; Martyn, supra note 1, at 709-11.
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sion as well as the rise of consumerism. Historical professional
trends, however, also appear to be crucial. The competence concern
can be seen as a response to the emergence of an increasingly diverse,
fragmented profession dominated by the market rather than by the
profession's traditional institutions.3 It appears to be an attempt to
reaffirm the traditional ideal of a homogeneous, highly respected and
self-regulating legal profession. The current competence movement,
therefore, cannot be separated from an agenda defined by particular
professional interests. An examination of recent Supreme Court
cases, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct demonstrates, however, that
the recent competence movement conflicts profoundly with other
values that are not likely to be given up-notably client autonomy
and consumer accessibility. We therefore need not even step outside
of the reigning professional values-in part, of course, the product of
pro-consumer changes forced on the legal profession in the last two
decades-to see the limits of any approach that focuses single-
mindedly on professional performance.
The recent concern with upgrading legal performance, in short,
offers little of substance that can benefit consumers of legal services.
It conflicts with other constitutionally protected values consumers
would prefer to maintain, and it appears doomed to failure. Con-
sumers increasingly will be free to make their own choices about the
quality and price of legal services.
Part III then asks how a consumer perspective4 -one that rec-
ognizes competence as one value to be considered along with accessi-
bility and client autonomy-might be developed on the problem of
professional quality. It begins with the recognition that rights to
choose accessible legal services do not guarantee that consumers ac-
tually will make good bargains. A consumer perspective can suggest
some approaches to further the interest in facilitating quality legal
services at reasonable prices. Trial practice rules,5 new educational
3. My approach to the market for legal services relies in part on Richard Abel's recent
analysis of the English legal profession. See Abel, The Politics of the Market for Legal Services,
in LAW IN THE BALANCE: LEGAL SERvIcEs IN THE EIGHTIES 6 (P. Thomas ed. 1982), reprinted
in modified form as Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1117.
4. Such a perspective on the lawyer-client relationship owes much to recent work initi-
ated by D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT, WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974). Rosenthal's re-
search showed that clients cannot depend upon lawyer professionalism to maximize client
interests, since lawyers and clients do not necessarily have the same interests. Rosenthal be-
gan the call for more client control over decisionmaking in the lawyer-client relationship.
5. See, e.g., suggestions in Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to
Practice, supra note 1.
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requirements,6 peer review systems7 and the like must be evaluated
not merely for what they might contribute to a collective upgrading
effort, but also for their impact on the consumer of legal services.'
I. COMPETENCE AND INCOMPETENCE: SEARCHING FOR A PROBLEM
AND A SOLUTION ACHIEVABLE THROUGH PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION
The recent professional movement has developed without a
clear conception of what the lawyer competence problem is or how it
might be solved. The immediate causes of concern were the state-
ments made in the early 1970's by Chief Justice Burger 9 and
others,1l primarily appellate judges, criticizing the quality of trial
and appellate court lawyers. The first professional response to these
rather unsystematic appraisals of lawyer competence was skepti-
cism or even disagreement. Several thoughtful commentators called
for empirical research about professional quality,11 and Marvin
Frankel emphasized a maxim of caution, primum non nocere.1 2 Stud-
6. Different continuing legal education programs are described in Gilbreath, Maintain-
ing Competency Among Lawyers: How Far Have We Come?, 24 CATH. LAW 162 (1979); Com-
ment, Proposals for the Improvement of Lawyer Competency, 18 WiUAmETTE L. REV. 301
(1982). Although these programs may help to improve the quality of the profession, they
could be quite burdensome to many lawyers and somehow would need to be paid for by con-
sumers of legal services.
New curriculum requirements also could help to improve the quality of the profession.
See, e.g., Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980's: Whdt's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336
(1982). See also infra text accompanying note 187. Any assumption that new law school cur-
ricula will affect quality dramatically, however, cannot be substantiated. Skepticism about
Indiana's notorious (outside of Indiana) Rule 13 (IND. CT. R. pt. VI, R.13 (Burns, 1980)),
adopted in 1975, for example, is entirely justified. For an exchange on the merits of this state
bar effort to regulate the law school curriculum, see Boshkoff, Indiana's Rule 13: The Killy-
Loo Bird of the Legal World, LEARNING & L., Summer 1976, at 18, and Given, Indiana's Rule
1. It Doesn't Invite Conformity. It Compels Competency, LEARNING & L. Summer 1976, at 16.
For an empirical critique of the Indiana system, see Cutright, Cutright & Boshkoff, Course
Selection, Student Characteristics and Bar Examination Performance: The Indiana University
Law School Experience, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1975). South Carolina's similar requirements
of particular courses for admission to the bar are described in Littlejohn, Ensuring Lawyer
Competency: The South Carolina Approach, 64 JUDICATURE 109 (1980).
7. See A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEm (Discussion Draft, Apr. 15, 1980); ENHMCING
THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 271-97.
8. Consumers do have legitimate complaints about the quality of lawyers. See irfra
text accompanying notes 120-87.
9. See Burger, supra note 1. An update of his perspective appears in Burger, Some Fur-
ther Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 1; Kaufman, supra note 1. For a survey of judicial
views on competence, see Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978
Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 105.
11. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1; Rosenthal, supra note 1.
12. "First, do no harm." Frankel, supra note 1.
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ies have now been done, but very little evidence of measurable in-
competence has been uncovered.13 There also is no evidence that
lawyers are less competent now than in the past.14 The "problem"
has been difficult to document.
The professional reaction more recently, however, has not been
to discount the issue of competence. Professional leaders instead
have treated the issue with increasing seriousness. As discussed in
the next section, recent changes in the legal profession help to ex-
plain why influential leaders have embraced the competence issue
with enthusiasm. That explanation requires, however, an under-
standing of how generalized concerns with professional quality have
been translated into specific definitions of competence and a con-
crete agenda requiring increased professional regulation.
"Competence" appeared as a subject of explicit professional
regulation for the first time in 1969 as a canon of professional eth-
ics.' 5 The specific term, however, is not defined in the Canons, nor is
it defined in the current Code of Professional Responsibility. In the
Code, ethical considerations, which have only an "aspirational"
quality," prescribe that the lawyer "act with competence and
proper care,"17 keep "abreast of current legal literature and devel-
opments,"'I and "prepare adequately for and give appropriate at-
tention to his legal work." '9 Incompetence becomes a matter for dis-
cipline only if the lawyer handles a matter that "he knows or should
know he is not competent to handle,"20 fails to undertake "prepara-
tion adequate in the circumstances,' '21 or "neglect[s] a legal matter
entrusted to him."' 22
13. See, e.g., the criticisms by Blair, Trial Lawyer Incompetence: What the Studies Sug-
gest About the Problem, the Causes and the Cure, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 419 (1982); Cramton, supra
note 1. Social scientists have also noted the difficulty of separating "performance" from "out-
come." Saks & Benedict, Evaluation and Quality Assurance of Legal Services: Concepts and
Research, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 373 (1977). See also Burnis, Testing in Practice Skills, in
ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 136; infra notes 47-52 and accom-
panying text.
14. Cramton points out that the bar is probably better qualified and educated than in
the past. Cramton, supra note 1, at 6.
15. See R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 84 n.1 (2d ed. 1970).
16. Ethical Considerations technically are not binding, but they can be used to give
content to the binding Disciplinary Rules.
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
CPR].
18. CPR EC 6-2.
19. CPR EC 6-4.
20. CPR DR 6-101(A)(1). On disciplinary standards, see generally ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 335 (1974).
21. CPR DR 6-101(A)(2).
22. CPR DR 6-101(A)(3).
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While this standard sets forth a minimum level for acceptable
performance, it does not provide an adequate means to upgrade pro-
fessional quality. In practice, the vagueness of the standard makes it
difficult to measure professional competence objectively, or to disci-
pline individual lawyers for particular behavior. Content can be
given to the Code by assuming a prevailing level of performance
that is acceptable-competent. Incompetent performance then
would mean a quality below the existing professional norm.23 Physi-
cians still are evaluated by precisely such standards.24 Yet the re-
cent concern has been with the competence of the profession gener-
ally, and the Code is not responsive to this concern.
The emerging attitude of professional reformers is that collec-
tive upgrading is desirable and that the profession must play a lead-
ership role in the effort. As noted before, the President of the Ameri-
can Bar Association called competence the issue of the 1980's, and a
recent article in the ABA Journal suggested that the idea of peer
review was ready for implementation.2 5 Even the initial critics or
skeptics of the competence movement appear to have climbed
aboard the bandwagon.26 An array of articles and studies increas-
ingly assumes the existence of a serious competence problem that
the profession must address. The organizers of the Houston Confer-
ence on "Enhancing the Competence of Lawyers," held in 1981, ap-
pear to have captured the emerging consensus:
[Tihe conference was planned on the assumption that debate and discus-
sion over the extent of incompetence would lead nowhere and be dis-
tracting to the conference's fundamental concern with analyzing differ-
ent remedies. On the other hand, the conference planners believe that
incompetence within the profession-whatever its extent-does exist
and is a significant issue for the profession. 27
The A.B.A.'s proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
proffered in revised form in 1981 by the Kutak Commission 28 as po-
tential successors to the Code, respond to the concern with upgrad-
ing. Competence is placed first among all ethical requirements.2 9
23. See, e.g., R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 318-24 (2d ed. 1981).
24. See, e.g., A. HoLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW (1975).
25. Smith, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A. J. 451 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Frankel, in ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at
220.
27. ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at xii.
28. MODEL RuLIS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL RuuJs].
29. The drafters attempted to elevate the importance of competence: "This emphasis
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Further, according to Model Rule 1.1, "[c]ompetence consists of the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, preparation and efficiency rea-
sonably necessary for the representation. ' 30 It does not appear,
however, that this proposal can provide a basis for upgrading either.
While the 1981 Kutak draft creates some potential for upgrad-
ing depending on how the "reasonably necessary" standard is inter-
preted, it sacrifices the workability of an earlier draft circulated in
1980. Instead of the "reasonably necessary" wording, the 1980 draft
referred to "acceptable practice by lawyers undertaking similar
matters."' 31 The loss of precision in the 1981 version stems from the
drafting dilemma just mentioned. If there is a general competence
problem, which the critics assume, the lowest common denominator
approach of the 1980 draft is inadequate, and a more rigorous stan-
dard must be applied. The drafters need a definition of competence
that is both objective and capable of upgrading the unacceptably
low level of performance presumably found in the profession today.
The important 1980 ALI-ABA discussion draft of A Model Peer
Review System further suggests the direction in which professional
reformers are moving. 32 The purpose of the peer review system is
not just to impose discipline, 33 but also to provide objective stan-
dards that can be used to improve the practice of law generally. In-
deed, the interim report of the ABA Task Force on Professional
Competence, 34 circulated in late 1982 and already cited with ap-
proval by the current ABA President,3 5 specifically endorsed as
"minimal standards" the definition of competence found in the ALI-
ABA discussion draft.
In Section 1, the discussion draft first distinguishes competence,
defined as a "general condition of performance" from negligence, de-
has proven to be one of the few uncontroversial elements of the Kutak draft." See ENHANCING
THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at ix.
30. MODEL RuLES Rule 1.1.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.1 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30,
1980).
32. A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM, supra note 7. Similar efforts are undertaken by
Cort & Sammons, supra note 1; and Note, Evaluating "Competency" Criteria: Toward a Uni-
form Standard of Lawyer Performance, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1019 (1981).
33. A Model Peer Review System suggests both voluntary and referral methods of
obtaining candidates for review. Refusal to comply with referrals or recommendations for
improvement could lead to discipline. See A MODEL PEER REvIEW SYSTm, supra note 7, at §§
12-22.
34. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PROFES-
SIONAL COMPETENCE 4 (1982).
35. See Harrell, Increasing Lawyer Competency-A Blueprint for Action, 68 A.B.A. J.
1532 (1982). Harrell's "blueprint for action" is the interim report.
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fined as a "want of due care in performing a specific task."36 This
distinction clarifies the aim of peer review-to upgrade professional
performance. Peer review could also reduce individual acts of negli-
gence, but negligence is a problem the draft assumes can be treated
separately.
The draft then goes on to break new ground with a careful and
thoughtful analysis of the specifics of high-quality lawyering. Sec-
tions 2 to 6 set forth the rather strong burdens envisioned for prac-
ticing lawyers. Section 2, for example, reads:
An attorney should gather appropriate facts about a client's prob-
lem. A thorough, accurate, and clear set of relevant facts should be ob-
tained-from the client, from documents, and from other knowledgeable
persons and relevant sources. An attorney who voluntarily assumes
more work than he or she can adequately gather facts for is not excused
for failing to meet this standard 7
The lawyer must uncover the facts thoroughly, even exhaustively.
The problem of too much work or overcommitment can provide no
excuse. Section 3 imposes the same burden for legal research:
An attorney should formulate the material issues raised by the cli-
ent's problem. Once factual and legal issues are identified, the attorney
is responsible for an accurate determination of applicable law and for
identifying alternative legal responses to the problem. 
3 8
Sections 4, 5 and 6 then require the development of "a strategy of
legal problem solving,"' 39 "strategy execution," 40 and "following
through." 4
1
36. A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSrEM, supra note 7, at 12 (emphasis supplied).
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 17:
An attorney should develop a strategy of legal problem solving in collabora-
tion with the client. This strategy should be reasonably related to the goals and re-
sources of the client and should be discussed between them, with the attorney bring-
ing relevant considerations to the client's attention. The attorney should, before
going forward, receive the client's consent, or a knowing waiver of such consent.
40. Id. at 19:
What the attorney does for the client should be thorough yet economical and
responsive, accurate, consistent, and clear. This is true of oral and written presenta-
tions of legal and factual positions in consultations, negotiations, adjudications-in
everything an attorney does. In presenting his or her work, the attorney should
achieve rapport with those who participate in the client's matter and be firm with
adversaries when appropriate.
41. Id. at 20:
An attorney who undertakes to represent a client should see the client's prob-
lem through. Actions and alternative strategies agreed upon by the client should be
undertaken in a timely manner. The client should be informed of the completion of
actions, of delays, or of circumstances requiring reassessment or reformulation of the
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Having moved beyond vagueness and the lowest common de-
nominator approach, the criteria suggest the practice of a first class
corporate law firm.42 The expense of performing at this level can be
staggering. While the commentary to Section 5 acknowledges the
need to consider limitations of time and resources,43 it is referring to
execution of the strategies, not research to uncover all the facts and
possible legal approaches. The commentary to Section 2 emphasizes,
for example, that the "market mechanism" cannot be blamed for
less than competent action: "The need to earn a living is no justifica-
tion for performance below an adequate level of competence."14 4
"Adequate" appears to require at least that the lawyer gather
whatever relevant facts can be found and research whatever law bears
on the problem, and it may require more.
The draft's approach provides an attractive ideal: the compe-
tent lawyer has the responsibility to learn all the facts and legal op-
tions before advising the client and picking a strategy. If there is a
general, remediable deficiency in professional performance, it is
likely to be inadequate preparation and research. 45 Rigorous, well-
enforced requirements on lawyers could overcome these problems
and upgrade the profession as a whole, with quality insulated from
problems caused by the market for legal services. It is understanda-
ble that the draft has appealed to the ABA leadership.46
The first stumbling point, however, is that lawyers do operate
in a market, and the inadequacies of performance should be related
to what ordinary clients can and will pay for legal services.4' Thus, a
original strategy. A protracted problem should be subjected to periodic review. A
client for whom an attorney provides continuing services should be advised of rele-
vant changes in the law.
42. The standard is not unrelated to that being applied increasingly to criminal de-
fense. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
(1979); AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971). Simi-
lar factors may be at work in the effort to upgrade criminal defense, but criminal defense
differs from civil representation enough to confine discussion here to noncriminal matters.
43. A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEm, supra note 7, at 19 (comment to § 5).
44. Id. at 15 (comment 2 to § 5).
45. Almost all the empirical research reveals that lack of preparation is the most impor-
tant cause of performances deemed to be inadequate. See, e.g., the summary of the research in
Note, upra note 32, at 1024-26.
46. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 35; Smith, supra note 25.
47. In a thoughtful review of recent literature about legal education and the legal pro-
fession, Stewart Macaulay observes:
Indeed, what appears to be incompetence at trial in some cases may be no more than
lawyers doing the best they can in light of what their clients can pay. Perhaps law-
yers should turn away clients who cannot pay for complete first class legal service
rather than trying to wing it on their behalf, but this seems to be something other
than a question of competence.
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recent American Bar Foundation study by Dorothy Linder Maddi
of trial attorneys' views of trial advocacy found, inter alia, that
more than one-third of a sample of attorneys believed that economic
considerations affected the amount of time spent on a case,4" and
that excessive workloads contributed to problems in preparing a
case adequately for trial.4 9
Economic considerations and excessive workloads are closely
related. Most lawyers do not serve large corporations willing to pay
for however many hours are necessary for first-rate work, but rather
individuals or businesses who lack the ability simply to pass on costs
to consumers.50 Such a clientele leads to an "excessive" workload,
since lawyers' incomes depend on servicing large numbers of matters
that will support only limited bills. Professor Hazard makes this
point dramatically:
[I]t is not far wrong to say that lawyers for big corporations are the only
practitioners regularly afforded latitude to give their technical best to
the problems they work on. The rest of the bar ordinarily has to slop
through with quickie work or, as one lawyer put it, make good guesses as
to the level of malpractice at which they should operate in any given
situation. 
5 1
If these lawyers were required to prepare more than they judge to be
feasible economically, they would avoid cases where economic con-
siderations appeared to dictate a less than thorough performance.
The result could be as the ALI-ABA draft hopes, a higher standard
of performance, but the cost would be fewer cases (or less legal ad-
vice) and a higher cost per case. In the words of Stewart Macaulay,
"qualifications, skill and the opportunity to do a competent job
must be paid for by someone."512
Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two Recent Stud-
ies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 513 (1982).
48. Maddi, Improving Trial Advocacy. The Views of Trial Attorneys, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1049, 1068.
49. Id. at 1071.
50. See, e.g., Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional
Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1111 (1978). Heinz and Laumann note percep-
tively that:
[T]he discovery of a unique issue is likely to be a function of the amount of time that
lawyers devote to a case, and thus of the amount of money that the client spends on
lawyers. If the stakes are high, the problems can become very complex; if the client
lacks money, his problems are likely to be routine.
Id. at 1117.
51. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 152-53 (1978).
52. See Macaulay, supra note 47, at 513. Conceivably lawyers could work more, charge
less per hour, and earn less, but that prospect appears unlikely.
An economic analysis suggests that high quality may sometimes reflect overcom-
petence. As Earl Johnson notes, "one must be alert to the danger of labeling representation as
648
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The limited resources of the client population, moreover, are
not the only problem. The amount at stake in a particular dispute
also places limits on diligence in legal and factual investigations. Re-
cent research reveals that the mean amount in controversy in state
courts, excluding the vast number of small claims involving less
than $1000, is still only about $4500, and it is not much more in
federal courts.53 We cannot expect even rich clients to pay for pre-
mium legal performances when relatively small sums are in dispute.
Strict standards of performance thus appear to be inconsistent with
lawyer involvement in today's typical litigation.
We shall return to the trade-off between accessibility and quali-
ty performance. 5 4 The point now is that a demanding, relatively in-
flexible, definition of competence can be developed, offering some
promise as a means of upgrading professional performance through
professional regulation, and professional reformers are taking up
that challenge. Given the bar's laissez-faire past in regulating indi-
vidual lawyers and the economic difficulties a workable definition
such as that of the ALI-ABA draft may produce, however, it is ap-
propriate to ask why the organized bar is now so concerned with
competence and why reforms are taking this particular direction.
II. COMPETENCE AND OTHER COMPETING VALUES:
UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT REFORM EFFORT AND ITS
LIMITATIONS
The bar has tended to address the competence issue from a spe-
cial professional viewpoint that, as we shall see, exaggerates the im-
portance of a uniform standard of quality and neglects values a con-
sumer or public interest would assert. Before exploring those other
values-accessibility and consumer autonomy-it is appropriate to
ask how the issue of competence relates to long-term historical
trends in the legal profession. Obviously one cannot say that such
trends have created the competence movement, but any effort to
understand the current professional perspective and its limitations
must situate the competence issue within the evolving professional
setting.
The limitations on the recent competence effort derive from
high quality when it actually constitutes overinvestment that reduces a client's net recovery."
Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 567, 609 (1981).
53. See D. TRUBEK, A. SARAT, W. FELSTINER, H. KRIrNER, & J. GROSSMAN, THE
COSTS OF ORDINARY LITIGATION 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as D. TRUBEK].
54. See infra text accompanying notes 120-87.
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both the current market for legal services and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which reflects that market. Recent Supreme
Court cases have emphasized a right of consumer access to legal ser-
vices; at the same time, the legal profession has experienced growth
in size and diversity. Although these factors may have encouraged a
new concern with lawyer competence, they also militate against the
success of reforms directed towards uniform upgrading of the profes-
sion. Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the pro-
posed Model Rules illustrate a concern not only with accessibility,
but also with the related value of client autonomy. Any effort to
make competence the paramount professional value will conflict
with these values already accepted and implemented by professional
regulations.
A. The Legal Profession's Historical Perspective on Lawyer
Competence
In 1938, participating in a symposium condemning "the unau-
thorized practice of law," Karl Llewellyn asked a somewhat embar-
rassing question: "Who is worrying about unauthorized practice,
and why? Is it the public, complaining of quacks? Is it the profes-
sion concerned about the public welfare? Or who and why?""5 As
Llewellyn and other commentators have recognized, the lack of pay-
ing work in the depression to a large extent explained the bar's sensi-
tivity to the problem of unauthorized practice, or competition by
nonlawyers. Neither public demand nor concern about public wel-
fare adequately justified the sudden emphasis on eliminating the un-
authorized practice of law.56 It was primarily the profession's is-
sue-not that of the general public.
To be sure, there are complaints today by the public about the
legal profession and the services that lawyers perform." Thoughtful
members of the profession no doubt also believe that the profession
must be upgraded in the public interest. But those public-minded
concerns must be considered along with any professional bias that
can be detected. As in the 1930's, the response to a perceived public
55. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices - and Cures?, 5 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 104, 105 (1938).
56. This argument has been made effectively and in great detail in Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
57. See, e.g., B. CURRAN & E. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIc 210-14,229-
31, 234 (1977). See also Abel, supra note 3. According to Abel, "client evaluation of profes-
sional performance is based on the form in which those services are rendered, the equivalent of
the doctor's bedside manner, not their substance." Id. at 37 (emphasis supplied).
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problem-this time the quality of licensed lawyers, not the alleged
abuses of unlicensed legal practitioners-has been consistent with a
relatively narrow professional view of the problem and how it can be
solved. The current quest for a uniform, high standard of compe-
tence should be understood in relation to the traditional ideal of an
elite, homogenous, self-regulated profession.
First, a uniform standard of competence traditionally under-
pins the legal profession's claims to monopoly and to self-regulation.
As the current President of the American Bar Association observed:
"The legal profession can take pride that it has acknowledged the
need for greater emphasis on competence on its own initiative. How-
ever, the self-regulation that has been exercised by the legal profes-
sion requires no less."II The unwritten contract between the profes-
sion and the public provides that lawyers will be left alone and given
a monopoly in exchange for the promise that a high-quality service
can be obtained from anyone with the professional license. If the
public begins to have a different perception, the professional claim
to independence may be threatened.
Second, competence is a way to protect the prestige of the pro-
fession and respect for the legal system. Lawyers collectively are
more respected if "incompetent" practitioners are denied licenses or
rooted out. A repeated theme in the professional elite's efforts at
self-regulation is that a small number of unprofessional or incompe-
tent lawyers can undermine respect for lawyers as a group. Further-
more, the system of justice generally and the adversary system in
particular will be more respected if each individual represented by a
lawyer can be confident of having his or her rights protected compe-
tently. As stated succinctly in 1979 by the English Royal Commis-
sion on Legal Services: "All who get legal services should get the
same standard of service." 59
Finally, a high, uniform standard of competence may protect
the incomes of some sectors of the profession from the ravages of
unrestrained competition.6" Clearly this is no concern of the bar
elite-the leaders of the competence movement-but it can help to
produce a coalition in favor of the renewed emphasis on competence.
These traditional professional concerns can be seen, for exam-
ple, in the history of restrictions on bar admission and requirements
58. Harrell, supra note 35, at 1532.
59. ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVicEs, FINAL REPORT, CMD. 7648, § 5.5 (1979).
60. According to one commentator: "In the classic personal professions, association
and colleague control emerged in relation with market organization; they now appear to be
warrants against the temptations of the market." M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL-
img: A SOCIOLoGICAL ANALYSIS 226 (1977).
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of a particular type of legal education. 61 In the 1920's, in particular,
the bar elite's overriding concern about competence led to impor-
tant professional reforms. The reforms were primarily a response to
the perceived danger of an influx of lawyers lacking the gentlemanly
background of the established elite. Many observers believed that
large numbers of new lawyers, especially immigrants trained in
night law school, were "unfit." Exhibiting "racial tendencies toward
study by memorization," ' 62 they were ill-suited to a profession re-
served for only the most brilliant sections of society. Inferior lawyer-
ing also was claimed to be a cause of unequal justice for the poor, an
ironic suggestion when the remedy is to make lawyers less accessible.
In Jerold Auerbach's critical words:
The overriding urge was to make the bar safe for Americans, not to pro-
vide equal justice or equal access. The inferior quality of the bar was
blamed upon easy access; the denial of justice to the poor, in turn, was
blamed upon an inferior bar. To elitists, in practice or in the profes-
soriat, the remedy was obvious: the quality of the bar and the quality of
legal services would improve only if professional access were re-
stricted. 6 3
Furthermore, while bar leaders feared that the profession was filling
up with incompetent practitioners, many in the bar's rank and file
feared that increased competition would cut into their clientele and
61. J. AUEREBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAwYERs AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 120-29 (1976). Roscoe Pound's celebration of the virtues of bar associations in The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times (1953) makes the point from the bar's point of view.
"What is a bar association?," he asks, and then responds as follows:
The bar association as an organization of those practicing the profession is an essen-
tial element of professional life. It is only through organization that the spirit of
public service can be developed and maintained and crucial types of public service
can be rendered effectively. It is the bar association, not the individual lawyer that
can maintain high educational standards insuring a learned profession, that can
maintain high standards of character as a prerequisite of admission to practice, that
can formulate and maintain high standards of ethical conduct in relations both with
clients and with courts.
Id. at 10-11.
Interestingly, Herbert Harley's arguments prior to World War I for an integrated bar
included the need for lawyers to develop "class-consciousness." See D. McKEAN, THE INTE-
GRATED BAR 35 (1963). Harley's arguments in another setting carefully linked competition
and quality. He praised restrictions on entry in Ontario as follows:
The aspirant to legal honors must indeed make sacrifices in Ontario. . . .But
when admission is won finally there is compensation. The candidate finds himself in a
profession which is looked up to. He is free from the demoralizing competition which
dulls the conscience of the young practitioner in the States. He is not impelled by
starvation to cruise along the ragged coast of impropriety.
Harley, Ontario Courts and Procedure II. The Bar, 12 MICH. L. REV. 447, 450 (1914).
62. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 61, at 107.
63. Id. at 116.
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incomes. This coalition prompted reforms to restrict entry into the
profession. The most notable reforms were higher educational stan-
dards, the creation of integrated state bars, and new requirements
that potential lawyers obtain experienced sponsors who would
vouch for their fitness and qualifications.64
While the new reforms did not remake the bar completely in the
image of the bar's elite, they did limit somewhat the possibilities of
entering the profession. The law school, rather than alternative
means of study and apprenticeship, became "the center for the pro-
duction of lawyers." 65 Training, education, and testing became the
accepted guarantees of competence, and the methods for restricting
entry into the profession.66 State bar associations, in addition,
gained more power to judge the suitability of potential lawyers and
to regulate those admitted to the bar.
In retrospect, the reforms of the 1920's appear relatively mod-
erate, even if they contributed to reducing consumer access to the
profession and indirectly raised the costs of legal services. What is
important to see, however, is that elite concerns with the public's
perception of the quality of the legal profession and the legal system
joined forces with the concerns of rank-and-file practitioners regard-
ing competition to place "competence" on the agenda for reform.
Furthermore, the professional response can be seen as an attempt to
bolster the ideal of a uniform, high-quality profession. At least one
notable reformer, Alfred Z. Reed, called for a frank acceptance of
professional heterogeneity and stratification,67 but the idea of pro-
fessional homogeneity continued to prevail. The bar, of course,
could not in fact be made completely homogeneous or of a consist-
ently high quality, but the reforms at least helped to sustain the
appearance of uniformity and quality.
The leaders of the legal profession today also believe that the
public perception of uniform lawyer competence needs to be
strengthened through new professional reforms. In part, of course,
the leaders have acted to reassure the public after such well-publi-
cized criticisms as those of the Chief Justice. But the current compe-
tence movement has a deeper logic as well. It responds to a series of
64. See id. at 102-29; supra note 61.
65. See M. LARSON, supra note 60, at 178.
66. See id. at 231.
67. Reed, a staff member of the Carnegie Foundation, was commissioned by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1913 to report on the system of legal education. His 1920 report, enti-
tled Training for the Public Profession of Law, surprised ABA leaders and called for an explicit
division of the profession into a well-educated elite and a second group educated at more
accessible and practical night law schools. His proposals were condemned by most of the bar
leadership. See generally J. AUERBACH, supra note 61, at 109-13.
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recent changes that have made it increasingly difficult to sustain the
traditional ideal. Recent Supreme Court decisions regarding con-
sumer access to the profession combined with the influx of new attor-
neys have created a situation that appears to demand new profes-
sional initiatives to regulate and upgrade lawyer quality. An
overriding professional concern with uniform competence, however,
conflicts with these decisions, economic reality, and the values of
consumer accessibility and client autonomy now reflected in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The movement thus offers little
to the consumer, because it neglects important consumer values. It
also can promise no real change in the profession, since it is unlikely
to succeed in overcoming those values and the new market for legal
services discussed next.
B. Competence and the New Market for Legal Services
Since 1963, the Supreme Court consistently has emphasized a
right of access to legal services,6" and the inevitable result, whether
or not confronted explicitly, has been to eliminate traditional rules
that promoted the ideal of professional homogeneity. Traditional
practices that favored a relatively uniform, stable, and high-priced
standard of performance, have fallen one by one. The cumulative
result, combined with another influx of new lawyers, is a potential
challenge akin to that of the 1920's, and it is understandable that
the bar has reacted.
The Supreme Court first decided that state bar associations and
other state agencies no longer can prevent individuals from joining
together to purchase lower cost legal services from attorneys. Such
prohibitions, the Court held in United Mine Workers v. Illinois State
Bar Association,69 violate the first amendment. The issue before the
Court was only the right of access, but the record showed plausible
evidence that access came at some cost in the quality of professional
performance.7 ° Cheaper services were less likely to result in diligent
research and representation. As Justice Harlan complained in his
dissent, there was evidence in the record which "Illinois may reason-
ably consider to present the danger of lowering the quality of repre-
sentation furnished by the attorney to union members in the han-
68. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
69. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
70. Id. at 224.
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dling of their claims. '"71 The Mine Workers' attorney had a huge
caseload and rarely appealed any cases.72 While no particular exam-
ple of poor representation could be cited, the lawyer could not have
provided consistently high-quality legal services. The Mine Work-
ers' contract with the lawyer was a bargain for cutrate legal services;
that bargain can no longer be prohibited in the interest of a profes-
sional ideal.
In 1975, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,7 3 the Court then pro-
hibited local minimum fee schedules as violations of federal anti-
trust laws. Learned professions, the Court held, are "trade or com-
merce," and cannot justify this particular "anticompetitive
conduct." 4 In labeling legal practice trade or commerce, the Court
helped push lawyers more deeply into the marketplace. Cost-cut-
ting, as the profession has long recognized, threatens the goal of uni-
form high quality: "The view that inadequate fees will lead to infer-
ior legal services goes back to the old. Canons. . . ,, The Supreme
Court's decision in Goldfarb thus pushed the profession further from
the ideal of uniformity in professional quality and performance.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,76 two years later, the Court
went the next step toward legitimating explicit price competition.
The first amendment and the public interest in the accessibility of
legal services prohibit an absolute ban on advertising. The Court
refused to take seriously the argument that advertising and price
71. Id. at 226 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 231-32. For example, the attorney handled more than 400 claims per year,
negotiated settlements on behalf of a number of clients simultaneously and had very little
personal contact with clients. He was paid relatively little ($12,400 per annum) and devoted
little time to each case.
73. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
74. Id. at 787. The medical profession's turn came in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, _ U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
75. See ANNOTED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 105 (1979). See also id. at
184.
Speiser's treatise on attorneys' fees characterizes price competition as follows:
This is a vicious practice which often results in dissatisfaction on the part of the
client and in complete lack of loyalty by the client to the lawyer; and although it may
mean a temporary or one-time fee to that particular lawyer, it only contributes to the
down-grading of the standards, as well as the economic status, of the profession.
2 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES 513 (1973).
76. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). A recent case affirmed Bates. In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See generally L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER AD-
VERTISING AND SOLICITATION (1980); Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment,
1981 Am. B. FOuND. RESEARCH J. 967.
The prohibitions on advertising and price competition were developed largely in the
profession's interest. See Fennell, Advertising: Professional Ethics and the Public Interest, in
LAw IN THE BALANCE: LEGAL SERVICES IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 3, at 144, for a useful
discussion of the prohibition in England.
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competition could adversely affect the quality of service. 77 Here,
too, the Court would not deny consumer access in the interest of
bolstering a professional ideal.
Individual lawyers have been freed from a number of tradi-
tional professional restrictions. Price competition has been sanc-
tioned; and the policy of accessibility, found to have constitutional
significance by the Supreme Court, has been implemented through
forced marketing changes in legal services.78 The American Bar As-
sociation's Task Force on the Role of the Lawyer in the 1980's thus
acknowledged a dramatic change in the character of the profession:
In the 1980s, the marketplace is a laboratory for new, organizational
structures struggling to meet the needs of the public. The catalysts for
change are in place: new requirements in the type of legal services clients
need, increased competition among various types of purveyors of legal
services, and a greater range of tools available to the practitioner.
7 9
Although not yet demonstrated empirically, this series of
events may in fact have led to some reduction in quality of legal
services as consumers obtain cutrate legal services. The problem of
quality, however, must be seen in relation to the set of characteris-
tics that have supported the profession. The challenge is to sustain
traditional professional values generally in a new era of price compe-
tition and bargain legal services. Marketing changes challenge the
ideal of a homogeneous, well-respected, self-regulating profession
that guarantees competent professional service from all its mem-
bers, even if at a premium cost.
What Reed proposed in the 1920's and the ABA reformers re-
fused then to accept has come closer to reality. Existing divisions
within the profession have been magnified, and new divisions have
been created. Furthermore between 1970 and 01980, the number of
77. 433 U.S. at 378-79.
78. The same line of reasoning could lead to attacks on the laws precluding the "unau-
thorized practice of the law." Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 TEX. L.
REV. 1269, 1273 (1980). The arguments are made in Rhode, supra note 56. See also Christen-
sen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even
Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 159. Paradoxically, however, the improve-
ments in accessibility that come with deregulation within the profession may reduce external
pressures for complete deregulation. If lawyers will be available at lower fees, there will be less
public concern about the high cost of obtaining legal advice and assistance, which would in
turn reduce pressures to allow lay individuals to provide legal services.
A recent criticism of the unauthorized practice doctrine as it applies specifically to own-
ership of legal clinics is Note, Legalizing Nonlawyer Proprietorship in the Legal Clinic Industry:
Reform in the Public Interest, 9 HOPSTRA L. REV. 625 (1981). The author argues that private,
nonlawyer ownership must be permitted.
79. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF THE
LAWYER IN THE 1980's 16 (1981).
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lawyers per 100,000 in the population increased by forty-six per-
cent. 0 The challenge today is not an influx of immigrants lacking
the traditional graces of the gentleman lawyer (although there may
be a reaction to affirmative action in the recent concern with compe-
tence). Rather, it is the influx of "unprofessional" lawyers who, tak-
ing advantage of Supreme Court liberality, may cut costs and quali-
ty in order to attract clients."1 The important ideal of high-quality,
professional legal services is becoming ever more difficult to sustain.
Indeed, more than status is at stake; if unrestrained competition is
the norm and the professional image suffers too much in the public's
perception, there is always the possibility of the bWte noire of the pro-
fession, governmental regulation.8 2
The collapse of even the appearance of professional homogene-
ity and uniform quality-which the absence of closed panel group
legal services, 3 price competition, and advertising helped to sup-
port-poses a real dilemma for those oriented toward traditional
professional values. Moreover, at least some sectors of the profes-
sion fear the economic consequences of cost-cutters and increased
competition. If the profession is kept relatively small in relation to
demand, the monopoly of suppliers can be expected to keep lawyers'
prices high. The new influx of lawyers, however, makes the rules of
competition quite significant. New and aggressive marketing can
take business away and lower the prices of those who were content
80. The number of lawyers per 100,000 population went from 174.30 in 1970, to 251.31
in 1980. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 95-96 (1981).
. 81. For a favorable empirical evaluation of this phenomenon, see Muris & McChesney,
Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 179. See also Christensen, Toward Improved Legal Service Delivery: A
Look at Four Mechanisms, 1979 A. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 277; Project, An Assessment of
Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980).
Two of the larger discount legal services chains are discussed in the following sources:
Jenkins, Chain Gang: Is the World Ready for Discount Legal-Services Chains? Joel Hyatt
Thinks So, TWA AMBASSADOR, Oct. 1982, at 14 (discussing Hyatt Legal Services); and Swee-
ney, When is a Lawyer Like a Bar of Soap?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 29, 1981, at B8 (Dart
Legal Centers).
82. This possibility is discussed in Martyn, supra note 1, at 734-36. See also supra note
58 and accompanying text.
83. Closed panel plans are those where the members of the group must select a lawyer
from a particular list of lawyers or from among lawyers paid a salary by the plan. An open
panel plan is where any lawyer chosen is paid by the plan or the client is reimbursed. The bar
has tended to favor open panels, analogous to the medical profession and Medicare. Open
panel plans can avoid the problem of lawyers agreeing to charge less for legal services in ex-
change for assured business from the group, and they also pose no threat that plan sponsors
will pressure lawyers to cut costs to make a plan profitable. See W. PFENNIGSTORF & S. KIM-
BALL, LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION 5 (1977).
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with the earlier situation.84 While the elite members of the bar obvi-
ously do not fear the proliferation of lawyers and the emerging price
competition, the effort to redefine competence can be crucial eco-
nomically for the less secure members of the profession or for those
who are trying to break in. Given what appear to be justifiable elite
worries about professional quality, independence, and prestige in
the new era of the 1980's, one finds the same constituencies behind
upgrading competence now as the ones behind restricting entry into
the profession earlier in this century. 5
The legitimate concern with professional quality, we shall see,
can be addressed in a number of ways. Indeed, several useful ideas
are already receiving considerable attention. But an important,
even dominant theme of the current campaign to make competence
the issue of the 1980's has been the effort to upgrade the bar collec-
tively through new regulations imposing a uniformly high profes-
sional standard.86 This campaign is understandable from a tradi-
tional professional perspective. In the view of the bar elite, it may
help to prevent competition from undermining professional stan-
dards too much,8 reducing respect for lawyers as a group, and per-
haps raising the specter of regulation by the government. It also
may help limit competition that is deemed destructive by the rank
and file.
Yet this particular professional approach appears to reflect a
reluctance to embrace what Murray Schwartz has called "the shift,
compelled by court decision and the push for a mass legal services
delivery system, from a bar-regulated delivery system to a market-
84. Cf. Bellow, Which Lawyers Win?, WORKING PAPERS, Fall 1976, at 4 (discussing
advertising restrictions and who they benefit).
85. Depending on the local situation, competence standards could be a weapon against
legal clinics, which as a matter of policy may not ask some kinds of questions and undertake
investigations of facts. Such standards also could be used against small practitioners who
practice an inefficient law; they could be found to be too unsystematic and haphazard in their
approaches. In the latter case, the competence criteria would accelerate the movement toward
more efficient, mass delivery services that maximize the use of economies of scale through
standard forms and involvement of paralegais.
86. Interestingly, in the same speech in which David Brink termed competence the
issue of the 1980's, he noted that "access" was the issue of the 1970's. See ENHANCING THE
COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 301.
87. Another phenomon related to concerns with competition is the effort to stimulate
the demand for legal services that clients traditionally have not sought (like medical services
with Medicare). See Abel, supra note 3. There is some truth to the statement of two English
commentators that, "[flrom this view . . . the lawyer has need of the poor, but what we have
yet to establish is whether the poor need lawyers." A. BANKOWSKI & G. MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF
LAW 79 (1976).
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regulated one.""8 Moreover, a closer look at reigning professional
ethics suggests some real obstacles to making competence the para-
mount value. As the present and draft codes of professional respon-
sibility make clear, the profession has already moved too far in the
direction of values other than the desire for a homogeneous and
high-quality professional product. This time, we shall see, the revi-
val of an ideal of homogeneity will be more difficult than ever.
C. Competence and The Code of Professional Responsibility
The Code of Professional Responsibility can best be understood
as an uneasy truce among a number of competing and even incon-
sistent values-including loyalty to the client, zealousness on behalf
of the client, loyalty to the legal system; accessibility, and compe-
tence.8 9 The Code cannot provide clear answers to difficult ques-
tions precisely because it always points in multiple directions. Nev-
ertheless, the Code still provides a useful map of the contours of
legal professionalism. It is a map that may be more reliable than
other statements of the professional self-image. As will be seen, how-
ever, an effort to push competence to the forefront through a uni-
form measure of performance would radically transform the balance
of professional and consumer values currently enshrined in the
Code. Other key values, notably those of client accessibility and cli-
ent autonomy (a value derived from concerns with loyalty and zeal-
ousness to the client's wishes), are not likely to be given up in favor
of competence.
The value of accessibility should be considered first. The acces-
sibility trend, as discussed before, has been the impetus for change in
the market for legal services. Despite the opposition of much of the
organized bar,90 the trend has been built on a constitutional founda-
tion, in turn based on certain assumptions about the virtues of price
88. See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 953, 962. Economists, it should be noted, have often advocated this change for both lawyers
and doctors. See, e.g., Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Econormist's View, 1976 Am. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 511. As noted in infra text accompanying notes 120-87, I am not satisfied that a
strict market/contract approach is necessarily in the interests of consumers of legal services.
89. Compare the recent exchange on the functions of the legal profession's ethical
codes. Abel, Why does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REv. 639 (1981);
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV.
689 (1981); Frankel, Why Does Professor Abel Work at a Useless Task?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 723
(1981).
90. See, e.g., Eson, Canon 2 - The Bright and Dark Face of the Legal Profession, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 306 (1975); Note, Group Legal Services and the Organized Bar, 10 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PnoBs. 228 (1975). The experience of one state is discussed in Delk, The Advent of
Prepaid Legal Services in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 271 (1977).
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competition and advertising as means to promote access and enable
the profession to satisfy the "unmet need" for legal services.9 1 The
Code of Professional Responsibility therefore must allow price com-
petition, advertising, and group and prepaid legal services; as a re-
sult, the Code changed substantially in the 1960's and 1970's.92
Competence concerns can no longer prevent these professional mar-
keting innovations. Individual examples of incompetence can be dis-
ciplined, but the profession cannot use the risk of substandard legal
services to proscribe marketing innovations that promote accessibil-
ity. In the foreseeable future, the Code will have to reflect Court-
permitted reforms in the means of supplying legal services.
If innovative institutions and marketing techniques were re-
quired to exemplify a single standard of competent legal perform-
ance, however, accessibility could still be reduced as a practical mat-
ter. Clients might be able to purchase only the Cadillac model of
legal services, even if from a plurality of dealers. There would be
very little price competition because the services could not vary sig-
nificantly, and consumers would gain little by new forms of practice
or widespread advertising of the same professional product. Another
newly embedded professional concern, that of client autonomy, pre-
vents such a one-dimensional standard.93
This conflicting value of client autonomy, which gives the con-
sumer a right to bargain for a more accessible professional product,
finds support in the current Code of Professional Responsibility and
appears even more strongly in the proposed Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The examination of the Code can be facilitated by
referring first to a hypothetical client who wishes to pay, or can pay,
no more than a given amount, say $500, for particular legal ser-
91. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970).
The emphasis on these reforms as means to fill the unmet need for legal services is especially
apparent in the majority opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977):
The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out
and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel
even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an
inability to locate a competent attorney.
433 U.S. at 370. For criticisms of this kind of reasoning, see, e.g., Marks, Some Research Per-
spectives for Looking at Legal Need and Legal Services Delivery Systems: Old Forms or New?, 11
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 191 (1977). The role of "legal needs" in the legal services movement is
described in B. GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR (1980).
92. Changes are especially apparent in CPR DR 2-101 (publicity) and DR 2-103 (rec-
ommendation of professional employment).
93. The pro-access cases can also be seen as cases potentially providing power to the
consumer. According to the Supreme Court in United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.,
401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971), "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the first amendment." See infra text
accompanying notes 177-86.
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vices.94 Varying the facts slightly, we shall also consider the situa-
tion where the client wishes to pay only $500 and the value of the
client's claim is $1000. The maximum amount that can be gained
from the representation or advice thus will be assumed to be $1000.
In each case, the lawyer could do legal and factual research at a
number of levels.95 We will stipulate that $500 worth of research or
services at the lawyer's normal billing rate would not exhaust the
subject in law or fact, but it probably would provide some insight to
the client that otherwise would not be available. The question to
guide our analysis of the Code is whether the lawyer can agree to
provide this level of service without subjecting himself or herself to
liability for failing to do exhaustive research. Liability could be im-
posed through a malpractice action brought by a client or a discipli-
nary action enforced by the bar.
The two disciplinary rules under Canon 6 of the current Code
are directly on point. A lawyer shall prepare adequately in the cir-
cumstances 9 6 and shall not attempt to limit liability for personal
malpractice. 97 The malpractice prohibition seems clear, but it could
be avoided by defining quality with reference to the $500 limitation.
There would be malpractice only if the $500 worth of work were
done negligently. Such a definition is not as implausible as it at first
seems to be. Even if an absolute standard aside from the $500 is
sought, issues will arise where $1000, or $2000, or $10,000, worth of
research would have turned a losing case into a winner. Presumably
any standard for deciding such malpractice cases still will have to
refer to some "appropriate" level of research. That level might just
as well be the level sought by the client, in which case we arguably
would not have a true example of contracting away malpractice.
The contract would only provide the setting for evaluating the qual-
ity of work.
94. Of course, the lawyer may be able to change the client's view of how much ought to
be spent by stating the likely result of investing more in a given matter. Nevertheless, the
client may not trust the lawyer's assessment or may decide that he or she does not want to risk
more than $500.
95. It is probably not too farfetched to suggest that practitioners proceed by consulting
sources in some fashion such as the following: practitioner's manuals (not always up to date),
legal encyclopedias, treatises, case headnotes, cases within the jurisdiction, cases outside the
jurisdiction, etc. One practical threshold is whether the research requires the lawyer to go
beyond the confines of the office library. Another is whether the research results in an exhaus-
tive memorandum or simply in a couple of cases somewhat on point.
Compare my approach, which assumes some client control, with the suggested theoreti-
cal framework in Johnson, supra note 52. Johnson emphasizes lawyer control over choices
regarding how much to invest in legal services.
96. CPR DR 6-101(A).
97. CPR DR 6-102(A). See also EC 6-6.
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Ambiguity in the words "adequate under the circumstances"
also merits attention. Can the client dictate the circumstances? The
American Bar Foundation's annotation to the Code provides some
help. It states that the lawyer "should weigh the cost to the client
against the potential benefit of added preparation." 9 According to
this view, the competence standard should not require the lawyer to
generate a fee "disproportionate to its value to the client."99 Simi-
larly, it has long been established that the fee charged by an attor-
ney should be set in relation, inter alia, to the "amount in-
volved. " 100 Thus, even when minimum fee schedules were allowed,
the Code suggested that a small claim might require lower fees and
thus, implicitly, less time.
When referring to collection of a small claim, therefore, it ap-
pears that the lawyer-sua sponte or in compliance with the client's
wishes--can decide to be somewhat less thorough. This is of course
economically reasonable in typical litigation, and the rationale has
been carried over into substantive areas of law, such as the law of
collateral estoppel.' 10 A lawyer is expected to devote less time and
resources to an issue that involves a relatively small amount in con-
troversy,102 even, it seems, to the point of losing on a particular le-
gal issue that might have been won if more preparation had been
done.
A second question is whether the client can elect in any event to
purchase the lower level of service that the lawyer could provide if
there were a small amount in controversy. Canon 7 of the current
Code requires the lawyer's "zealousness" in responding to the cli-
ent's decisions on matters of substance.' 03 This interpretation fol-
lows indirectly from the disciplinary rules' 014 and explicitly from
98. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 269 (1979).
99. Id.
100. See CPR DR 2-106.
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
The doctrine is recognized under the idea of foreseeability. If it was not foreseeable that an
issue in one case would be important in a subsequent action, the issue may be relitigated in the
second action. Presumably there was insufficient incentive to litigate the issue thoroughly in
the first action.
102. It is now generally accepted that small claims are not necessarily simple claims.
See Yngvesson & Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims
Literature, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 219 (1975). See also supra note 95.
103. Canon 7 provides as follows: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of Law." CPR Canon 7.
104. CPR.DR 7-101 states that a "lawyer shall not intentionally . . . [flail to seek the
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means. . . ... See also DR 7-102
(representing a client within the bounds of the law).
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ethical considerations 7-7 and 7-8.1°5 The client is to make basic
decisions, and one can suggest that the decision about the extent of
service to be provided is a fundamental one. Further, since the law-
yer unquestionably can consider the "value to the client" in decid-
ing the appropriate level of preparation, there must be a point where
the client's view defines the value of winning, or more accurately of
maximizing the chances of winning.' °6 The professional norm of
competence should not override choice here, given that the reduced
level of services would be acceptable if the value to the client were
low as an objective matter. Finally, the recent trend has been to ex-
tend the sphere of client autonomy.107 At the very least, therefore,
the Code is ambivalent as to the resolution of the hypothetical de-
scribed above. Too strong a commitment to competence'would run
counter to other, consumer-oriented values which, the analysis sug-
gets, already have a very strong claim on the profession. It would
raise prices and prevent the consumer from seeking other than the
premium professional product.
The same problem, perhaps even exacerbated, can be found in
the Model Rules. The Rules begin by stating the requirement of
competence in Rule 1.1, which provides for "the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, preparation and efficiency reasonably necessary
for the representation."' 0 8 Rule 1.3 also requires "reasonable
promptness and diligence."'' 9 Rule 1.2, however, states that the
"objectives of representation" are set by the client, and the lawyer
"shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
105. EC 7-7 states:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or sub-
stantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on
his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the
client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his
lawyer.
EC 7-8 requires that the client be "informed of relevant considerations" and states that "the
lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objec-
tives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself."
106. This is not to say, however, that other considerations such as the duty not to file a
frivolous lawsuit might be relevant at some point. See CPR DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2); FED. R.
CIv. PRO. 11. These rules seek to protect the legal system and other parties from the time and
expense of groundless claims.
107. Important recent discussions of client autonomy and "informed consent" as a
means to protect that autonomy include: Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981
Wis. L. RaV. 454; Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
307 (1980); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 4; Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: In-
formed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979); Spiegel, The New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structur-
ing the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1003.
108. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1.
109. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3.
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pursued." ''" Rule 1.4 concerns "communication" and also moves in
the direction of more client decisionmaking." I The official comment
to Rule 1.4 appears even to favor intelligent participation by clients
on questions of means as well as ends-'"to the extent the client is
willing and able to do so." 
112
The problem of balancing competence and client autonomy
again emerges. Rule 1.8(i), on malpractice, particularly illustrates
the problem; it appears to modify the traditional rule discussed
above that lawyers "shall not make an agreement prospectively lim-
iting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice.""' 3 Such an
agreement would be permitted, but only if "the client is indepen-
dently represented in making the agreement." ' 1 4 This resolution
may respect client autonomy to elect cheaper representation by
waiving malpractice, but the requirement of the additional costs of a
second lawyer may negate any savings. The client theoretically can
make a contract that takes away one safeguard of competence, but
the practical result appears to be the same as that dictated by the
current Code.
The same tension or even inconsistency appears in the com-
ments to some of the other rules. For example, one comment to Rule
1.2 states: In questions of means the lawyer should assume responsi-
bility for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the
client regarding such questions as the expense to be in-
curred. . . . " Another comment, however, says that "the client
may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to
violate Rule 1.1."' 16 This comment suggests that there is some irre-
ducible minimum level of competency below which lawyers cannot
sink. Yet Rule 1.1 refers to "reasonably" necessary services, and
presumably that suggests flexibility.
The key issue of who decides thus remains open. The suggestion
is that the client has a right to decide, but the practical result can
again be the opposite. If the lawyer's major concern is ensuring that
he or she satisfies a given definition of competence, the incentive will
be to play it safe, to keep fees high, and not to allow the client to
110. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). Rule 1.2(c) states that the "lawyer may limit the
objectives of the representation if the client consents after disclosure."
111. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4.
112. MODEL RULE Rule 1.4 comment.
113. MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(i). The only guidance in interpretation is the "Legal
Background," suggesting the rule applies most clearly to express releases from malpractice
liability.
114. Id.
115. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 comment.
116. Id.
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bargain for a relatively frugal legal effort. Again, what appears to be
conceded to client autonomy-a value ostensibly given more con-
cern in the Model Rules-may be taken away by the enhanced con-
cern in the Model Rules with competence; or, alternatively, it could
be that the pro-competence statements will fall to the new promi-
nence of client autonomy.
The Model Rules, in addition, explicitly recognize a sliding
scale of time and effort, which further complicates matters. One
comment to the Model Rules suggests that the "required attention
and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major
litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elabo-
rate treatment than matters of lesser consequence." 17 The compe-
tence requirement again may vary depending on the size of the
claim, but whether, or how much, it can vary according to the
amount the client is willing to pay is still not at all clear.
Both the Code and the proposed Model Rules, we have seen,
attempt to effect a truce among competing values, including those of
competence and client autonomy, and of course the emphasis on ac-
cessibility through marketing changes remains. Different sections of
the Code or the Model Rules send contradictory messages, and it is
very difficult to ascertain which value is paramount in a hypotheti-
cal that forces a choice. The contradictions have been overstated,
however, by focusing on a particularly tough case and by asking for
a clear-cut answer. It may be possible to find a line that can accom-
modate the competing concerns of accessibility, client autonomy,
and competence. What we shall see, however, is that such a line can
be drawn only if competence is defined in a very flexible or even min-
imalist manner.
The simplest workable definition of competence relies on what
most lawyers in fact do in practice. This approach has a long history
behind it and also can be adapted to fit the modern profession. The
diverse modern profession, with different client demands and deliv-
ery mechanisms, could even have different reference points for each
situation. We might then ask, for example, whether there are some
cases where it would be so outrageous to spend only $500 worth of
time on a particular legal job that no lawyer would accept the job,
regardless of the client's wishes. The money simply would be wasted
if the lawyer acted on that basis. In another case, we might ask if the
lawyer did a $500 job comparable to what the bulk of the practicing
bar would do. There is both flexibility and objectiveness in such a
standard, and it can accommodate the values of client autonomy
117. MODEL RuLES Rule 1.1 comment.
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and accessibility. The recurring problem is that this approach makes
competence a nonissue for the profession as a whole. It does not
force improvement in the performance of the bar generally since it
follows the status quo, and it loses the strength in application of a
single, uniform standard.
In light of the current professional ethical constraints, a more
serious effort to pursue the competence issue would be to vary the
profession's objective definition according to what the lawyer
charged, what the client wished to pay, or what the amount in con-
troversy was. Different contexts would require a different standard.
The "reasonableness" factor in the Code and in the Model Rules 1 "
could be interpreted to allow adjustment in accordance with indi-
vidual client decisions and the diversity of service-providing institu-
tions. Again, however, the practical result would be to lose the preci-
sion and power of the profession's current campaign. Developing
this plurality of standards alone would be very difficult. Applying
them effectively in the great variety of circumstances that can occur
in professional representation would be even more difficult. More-
over, such an approach, if serious about client autonomy, focuses
not on what the professionally defined standard in the circumstances
should be, but rather on whether the client got what he or she bar-
gained for. Thus, this kind of approach, which finds support in the
next section, has a very different focus than the professional model
we have seen." 9
If instead we prefer a uniform standard of competence, to be
consistent with the Code we must pick a standard sufficiently low to
be an irreducible minimum beyond bargaining. Given that the pro-
fession already recognizes and permits a plurality of lawyer efforts
depending on the values in controversy, a standard that is low
enough to accommodate the acceptable differences between first
class treatment and economy treatment of small claims probably
would be useless to the profession's campaign for collective self-im-
provement. It would leave no possibility for upgrading the profes-
sion as a whole along the lines of the ABA-ALI Model Peer Review
System. There would be no requirement of comprehensiveness in de-
veloping the facts and researching the law.
The profession's quest to enhance the level of competence
through professional regulation, therefore, cannot be harmonized
with the current balance of concerns in the Code or in the proposed
118. See CPR DR 6-101(A)(2) (requiring "preparation adequate in the circum-
stances") and MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 (requiring "reasonably necessary" preparation).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-87.
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Model Rules. The profession's current ideal seems to be a uniformly
high standard of competence ensured by professional supervision,
but that effort simply is inconsistent with the current standards for
regulating professional ethics. The Code and the Model Rules now
more than ever embody a number of competing values, and it is too
late to make competence a paramount concern.
The profession has changed, and the issue of lawyers' quality
makes no sense unless it is evaluated in light of those changes. The
traditional ideal of a homogeneous, high-quality profession may
have to be abandoned. The assault on traditional professional values
is being led by the new consumer values of accessible legal services
and client autonomy, and it now appears impossible to upgrade
quality through the imposition of a uniform standard high enough
to make any difference. If we are concerned with quality, we will
have to develop an approach consistent with accepted consumer
values.
III. COMPETENCE: TOWARD A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE
The key point about competence may be simply that the cur-
rent professional perspective on the issue is anachronistic and incon-
sistent with major and even constitutionally inspired themes in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The competing themes in the
Code-accessibility and client autonomy-have evolved in the past
twenty years along with what can be seen as the consumer move-
ment in legal services. Competence issues now should be addressed
from a consumer perspective within the framework of those themes.
The problem is addressing lawyer quality without abandoning ac-
cessibility and client autonomy.
This is not to say that consumers automatically benefit from
recent changes in the legal profession. Lawyers and clients are now
in the marketplace, but clients have no guarantee of a better value
from deregulation than regulation. Although the consumer has new
opportunities to select from a variety of legal investment strategies,
the opportunity to make favorable contracts may not be realized.
Before discussing ways that consumers might be helped to take
advantage of new opportunities, it first may be useful to set out ex-
plicitly the traditional professional perspective on competence and
to compare it with the contract model that is emerging. A consumer
model then can begin to address some of the problems faced by cli-
ents confronting a new marketplace for legal services.
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A. Evaluating Competence: From the Professional to the Consumer
Model
Two general approaches to evaluating competence can be out-
lined. One has already been suggested, the profession's model, which
is based largely on a uniform, professionally enforced ideal, applica-
ble to all lawyers. The other, implicit in the critique of traditional
professionalism, is based on contract and the competition of the
marketplace. Strengths and weaknesses of each model can be ex-
amined before turning to the specific problem of how to approach
the question of lawyer quality in a way that benefits consumers.
The professional ideal tends to favor a single, high-quality stan-
dard as a means to regulate all lawyers.' 20 If successful, or perhaps
even if it only appears to be taken seriously by the profession, this
model may help keep the prestige of the profession high, justify the
professional monopoly, and prevent further regulation from outside
the profession. Furthermore, if criticized as too expensive from the
client or consumer perspective, the professional response could be
that redistribution is irrelevant to quality concerns. If the public
wants a more equitable distribution of the service, the government
can take action, perhaps through subsidies, that is consistent with
the widespread provision of high-quality legal services. Similarly, if
the bar provides pro bono services for no fee or a low fee, those ser-
vices still should satisfy the high professional standard.121
Such an ideal would harmonize concerns with competence and
accessibility and would preserve the profession's ability to define
standards of quality. The argument for equal justice makes this ap-
proach attractive. Unfortunately the ideal has little in common with
legal services today in the United States 22 and has never been
reached anywhere in the world except perhaps in Sweden. 123 It is
120. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
121. The Code of Professional Responsibility makes no distinction between the treat-
ment of paying and nonpaying clients, but data collected by the University of Wisconsin Civil
Litigation Research Project suggest that practical differences do emerge in time allocation.
See D. TRUBEK, supra note 53. Similarly, interviews with lawyers in Shreveport found that for
clients "unable to pay the ordinary fee, the lawyer was forced to treat them as special cases, to
be helped only as time was available. The relationship was one of the charitable lawyer help-
ing the supplicant client." F. MARKS, R. HALLAUER & R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN:
AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 30 (1974). Cf. Lochner, The No Fee
and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 431 (1975).
122. See supra notes 45-53, 107 and accompanying text. See also Abel, Legal Services, in
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIOLoGY: FRONTIERS OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 407 (M. Mick-
lin & M. Olsen eds. 1981); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 30.
123. Of course, lawyers play a generally different role in Swedish society than in Ameri-
can society. The Swedish system is described in M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY, & E. JOHNSON,
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very expensive there and generally deemed prohibitively expensive
elsewhere. 1
24
In the United States, even in prosperous years, Legal Services
Corporation lawyers have had much higher caseloads than most
lawyers, especially most corporate lawyers.125 Much concern has
been expressed about the quality of legal services that poor people
have obtained.' 26 It is also often stated that legal services lawyers,
like wartime surgeons perhaps, quickly learn "bad habits" that
make them unsuited to teach or to practice high-quality law. 127
The full potential of redistribution of lawyers has not been ex-
plored in the United States, and it is unlikely to be explored in the
future.'12 Poverty lawyers must practice a kind of law that empha-
sizes "mass delivery" and maximum impact of legal services' 2 9 in-
stead of uniform, high-quality "mega-lawyering"' 30 along corpo-
rate lines. This kind of practice admittedly belies the ideal of the
adversary system and equal justice for all.' 3 ' Some clients get high-
quality work and others get only a few minutes of a lawyer's time. If
results depend in part on the performances of advocates, then it is
obvious that the distribution of legal services exacerbates inequali-
ties. Nevertheless, acquiescence in unequal standards of perform-
JR., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIErIES
525-84 (1975) [hereinafter cited as M. CAPPELLETI].
124. The English Judicare system, described id. at 271-385, has similar aspirations but
continues to have problems because of its cost. See, e.g., Partington, Problems of Principle, in
LAW IN THE BALANCE: LEGAL SERVICES IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 3, at 127. On recent
problems, see 31ST LEGAL AID ANNUAL REPORT 1980-81 (1982); Merricks, The Annual Re-
ports and the New Legal Aid Bill, 132 NEw L.J. 100 (1982).
125. On the caseloads of legal aid lawyers, see B. GARTH, supra note 91, at 166-69. On
differences among private attorneys, see, e.g., Laumann & Heinz, The Organization of Law-
yers' Work: Size, Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 217; Maddi, supra note 48, at 1057-58.
126. See Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1291. Of course, the analysis depends on what one thinks legal aid attorneys ought to be doing
on behalf of the huge number of individual clients they serve. See infra notes 169-76 and
accompanying text.
127. On the bad habits of legal aid lawyers, see, e.g., Bellow, supra note 126.
128. See Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can Redistributing Lawyers' Services
Achieve Social Justice?, 1 LAw & POL'Y Q. 5 (1979).
129. Marc Galanter, for example, has demonstrated the fallacy in the formula that
"the poor should receive the same quality and range of service as the rich." Galanter, Deliver-
ing Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of Research, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 225, 231
(1976). See generally B. GARTH, supra note 91, at 143-225.
130. See Galanter, Mega-law and Mega-lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 152 (R. Dingwall & P.
Lewis eds. 1983).
131. See the criticisms by Abel, supra note 122 and Simon, supra note 122.
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ance is inevitable in the real world. 132 It cannot be separated from
the constraints of the market for legal services. This is not to say
that redistribution should not be pursued as far as possible, but a
uniform competence standard will not solve problems that ulti-
mately must be traced to the unequal distribution of societal re-
sources. 133
The professional ideal, therefore, ignores the reasons why the
great number of practitioners, in Hazard's words, "slop through
with quickie work."' 34 It is completely unrealistic as an ideal for
solving problems of unequal access to legal services.1 35 Moreover, it
is inconsistent with values given constitutional status by the
Supreme Court and enshrined in the Codes of Professional Respon-
sibility.' 36 A new model is emerging, despite the elegance of the
traditional professional ideal.
The model for professional services that appears to be taking
shape is simply that of contract-the client or client group bargains
with the lawyer for the price and the level of services. 137 The profes-
sion no longer dictates the standard of service to be provided. In the
interests of accessibility and client autonomy, clients now have the
power to bargain for something other than the standard service,
which might be available only at a premium price. Competition, the
new model assumes, promotes accessibility, and the client popula-
tion is protected by traditional contract remedies. The consumer has
more "rights" and more freedom of choice. The new model, how-
ever, raises its own problems. We cannot stop the analysis by a rit-
ual incantation of the virtues of the market.
The serious problem, correctly perceived by professional lead-
ers in the competence movement, is that the ordinary client-the
132. See infra text accompanying notes 140-87.
133. While Marvin Frankel has now become a supporter of the competence movement,
he still points out its problems:
What if anything do we do, when we consider the need for competent lawyers, about
the millions of people with the millions of problems who are unable for one reason or
another to have any lawyer at all--competent or incompetent? Is that outside our
subject? To what extent is incompetence really a social and economic phenomenon
that resides primarily if not exclusively in the class of less affluent lawyers serving the
classes of less affluent people?
ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 230.
134. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 89-119.
137. A succinct statement of the free market case for a contract model of professional
services appears in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962). As suggested
infra text accompanying notes 120-87, Professor Friedman's faith that deregulation will solve
the consumers' problems is not accepted in this article, but there is no doubt that consumers
will have more opportunities to obtain legal services at lower prices.
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one supposed to benefit from accessibility and client autonomy-
may end up worse off, perhaps paying less for legal services but get-
ting no value for the purchase. The typical individual or small busi-
ness client has no basis for intelligently choosing what legal product
to purchase on what terms, nor for evaluating the lawyer's perform-
ance of the contract.138 Lawyers can use their technical expertise to
take advantage of clients' new-found freedom and turn the contract
model into a means of increasing profits with the sale of inferior and
sometimes even useless legal services.
The professional model potentially avoids these problems by
ensuring that the services will be uniform and of high quality. In
theory, the client can trust the lawyer and the profession's regula-
tion of the lawyer's performance. The profession, however, has
never policed itself to that extent. State bar associations to date
have done very little to require conformance with even the lowest
common denominator approach of the current Code.' 39 It is hard to
imagine a complete turnaround on the issue of competence. More-
over, as we have seen, it probably is futile at this point to insist dog-
matically that all lawyers do premium work even if costs are in-
creased, more clients are denied services, and clients or client groups
elect other than the premium standard.
A consumer perspective on the issue of the quality of the lawyer
product would have to preserve the pro-access, pro-client autonomy
direction of recent professional reforms while providing the means
for clients: (1) to make intelligent choices regarding legal services
investment; (2) to evaluate the results of professional services; and
(3) to obtain redress if lawyers have provided less than was prom-
ised. We also must ask more generally how the quality of profes-
sional services can be improved consistently with values of accessi-
bility and autonomy. These themes will underlie the following
discussion.
B. Informed Consent in the Legal Profession: Improving the
Consumer's Choice
The problem of what clients ought to decide requires considera-
138. That is not to say that larger corporate clients lack the ability and power to bar-
gain effectively with law firms. A recent article suggests a trend toward divisions within corpo-
rate services among options such as the following: "first class treatment," "business class,"
"semi-business class," and "tourist class." Brill, The Age of the Endless Docket is Over, AM.
LAw., Apr. 1982, at 8.
139. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, at 214-19; Martyn, supra note 1, at 707-
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tion of the doctrine of informed consent.14 ° Client decisions, espe-
cially about the amount of resources to commit to a legal problem,
depend upon information that often is possessed only by the lawyer.
A doctrine of informed consent purports to ensure that the client has
the ultimate power of choice and can obtain enough information
about the various options to make the choice intelligently. The law-
yer would have a duty to make the client aware of competing
options.
Unfortunately, the professional experience to date with the doc-
trine of informed consent-mostly limited to the physician-patient
relationship14 1 -has not been very successful.' 4 2 Some of the
problems in the medical setting merit attention before the legal pro-
fession embraces informed consent as a useful reform. The problems
stem in part from the fact that the contract model has not developed
as far in medicine as in law, 4 but they also run deeper because of
the nature of medical services.' 44
First, even to the extent patient autonomy generally is ac-
cepted as a vital goal, when a physician presumably is acting to save
a life it is difficult to see a violation of any important value of indi-
vidual autonomy. Second, patients may not be permitted to
purchase (or physicians to sell) services so inadequate that, for ex-
ample, an avoidable death will result. Such a consent will in any
event be so closely scrutinized that the physician runs a high risk
140. See supra note 107. Professor Rhode, arguing for deregulation beyond the profes-
sional monopoly, proposes that clients be able to purchase lay advice or representation within
a doctrine of informed consent. Rhode, supra note 56, at 95.
141. See, e.g., B. BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH
(1980); J. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT (1978).
142. See, e.g., Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L.
REv. 137 (1977); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Bal-
once Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413.
143. Professor Schuck, for example, points explicitly to the contrast between medical
malpractice law, medical professionalism and market principles. Schuck, Malpractice Liabil-
ity and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1421 (1981).
The pressures to move to the contract model are increasing, however, especially as a
means to control the government's costs of subsidizing health care. See generally P. STARR,
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 420-49 (1982). According to Blum-
stein and Sloan, "[h]ealth policy analysts are now much more prone to shift the burden to
those who claim that the market does not, cannot, or should not function properly in the
health sector." Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Goernment's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of
Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981). See generally Blum-
stein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 1345 (1981); Symposium, Market-Oriented Approaches to Achieving Health Policy Goals,
34 VAND. L. REv. 849 (1981).
144. For a critique of the market approach in health, see Rosenblatt, Health Care, Mar-
kets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1067 (1981); and Rosenblatt, Rationing "Nor-
mal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1401 (1981).
1983:639 Lawyer Competence and the Consumer Perspective 673
that the consent will not be accepted as informed and voluntary.
Finally, health and life are very difficult values to balance against
such factors as the cost, intrusiveness, and pain of a given medical
procedure. It is difficult even under the best of circumstances for a
patient to make a reasoned judgment, and as a result there typically
is more deference to a physician's decision than to a patient's effort
to assert the right of deciding how much treatment to accept.
These problems may be less serious for the lawyer-client rela-
tionship. 14 5 First, except perhaps for the criminal defense situation,
which is outside the scope of this article, lawyer-client decisions can
be grounded essentially on economic calculations about the value of
additional investment in legal services.146 Rather than matters of
life and death, the questions concern the economic benefits and risks
of alternative levels of legal performance. Clients can more easily
understand and evaluate this type of information, and their deci-
sions can be made on a more intelligent, well-informed basis. There
is a greater possibility, in short, to promote an informed consumer of
legal services than of medical services. The medical analogy should
not be persuasive.
Other problems remain. The client may be misled if the lawyer
does not provide accurate information. Further, the client's lack of
bargaining power, while perhaps not as obvious as in the medical
situation, may make choice an illusion. Given the ascendancy of
contract in the legal services setting, however, a consumer perspec-
tive demands some doctrine capable of bolstering the client's capac-
ity for intelligent choice. It provides the only way to reconcile client
autonomy with the typical client's lack of legal knowledge.
For an easy example, take the client who wants to bring a com-
plex antitrust action for $500. The client should be told that there is
virtually no chance of filing a lawsuit or even of persuading the po-
tential defendant to pay anything if only $500 is invested. The ex-
treme view of client autonomy would suggest that the lawyer not be
held responsible to the client or the profession if the client says,
"O.K., but I would like you to make a phone call anyway without
any serious documentation or research to tell them of my assertion
145. One could argue that the market system is less appropriate for lawyers than for
physicians because of the adversary nature of our system of justice. Physicians deal only with
individuals, whereas the adversary system requires roughly equal competence among several
parties, at least in litigation. This argument, however, is unconvincing. Litigation is the un-
usual situation, and trial is even more unusual. Moreover, the adversary ideal does not corre-
spond with the reality of the system today, nor with the emerging market context. See supra
notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
146. An investment model of legal services is described in Johnson, supra note 52; and
D. TRUBEK, supra note 53.
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that they have violated antitrust laws" and the lawyer does so. Al-
though a conscientious lawyer might decide not to take such a cli-
ent,147 the lawyer could decide to provide the service.14' The need
from a consumer perspective is for the client to understand to the
extent possible his or her choices.
This standard of informed consent differs from that found in the
ALI-ABA Model Peer Review System, which requires the lawyer to
find out all the facts and law and then tell the client what alterna-
tives are available, and at what cost. Informed consent comes only
after all the research is completed. What is suggested here is that the
client should decide beforehand whether he or she wants that poten-
tially expensive legal diagnosis. The fully informed client might de-
cide to ask for limited lawyer research if the lawyer explains that the
advice will be based on a less than comprehensive investigation and
that there are specific risks in such an approach.
A more problematic case is where the client asks the lawyer for
help but claims an inability to pay more than a small sum. A lawyer
technically is not permitted to say that he or she will help but will
spend very little time or energy on the case. 149*Such a bargain is not
very attractive, even if it means that clients obtain at least some
legal help from a professional. There is evidence, however, that such
bargains are made already, and, worse yet, that pro bono clients
often are surprised to find that they end up with little or no lawyer
commitment. 1 0 .Informed consent would at least let the client de-
cide whether to entrust the, problem to a lawyer who will expend
minimal effort or to take the problem elsewhere. Although informed
consent will not necessarily make the bargain fair, clients may be
prevented from wasting their time and limited money when the
chances of success are too slight, or from expecting a quality per-
formance when the lawyer never intended to provide it.
. Informed consent, in short, offers considerable promise; lawyers
will have to learn the art of explaining their capabilities and limits.
Still, of course, a client may have trouble evaluating whether the
lawyer held up his or her end of the bargain. This problem already
exists, but the professional model at least holds out the possibility
that the quality of the professional product can be assessed and reg-
ulated by a uniform standard. The contract model complicates the
147. The right to refuse a client is set out in CPR DR 2-110. See also EC 7-8 (referring
to withdrawal).
148. It can be suggested, however, that if the services are of such a level as to be useless,
the lawyer will have a very difficult time showing that the consent really was informed.
149. See supra note 121.
150. See supra note 121.
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problem because of the varying levels of service that could be per-
mitted. Contract remedies are available, but the question is how a
client can invoke them realistically given a lack of ability to evalu-
ate the lawyer's work.
The following two sections thus return more specifically to the
problem of policing the quality of the professional performance.
Even if informed consent leads to an intelligent bargain as to the
level to be purchased, the consumer may gain little without effective
means to evaluate the quality of both the information provided as a
basis for the decision and the lawyer's performance of the agreed
upon services.
C. Monitoring Quality From a Consumer Perspective: Remedies for
Neglect
Most client complaints today are for neglect,1"' which com-
mentators distinguish from problems of competence. A client who is
the victim of lawyer negligence should of course have a remedy, such
as an action for malpractice. The lawyer's mistake could be one of
giving wrong information that leads the client to purchase or decline
a certain level of legal services.
Even though the current systems for redressing legal malprac-
tice have not been considered adequate for consumers of legal ser-
vices, 152 the client, in fact, will have greater difficulties under the
model of contract that has recently emerged. If the client can bar-
gain for a particular level of services, negligence can no longer be
determined simply by referring to what a typical practitioner would
have done. Negligence may not then be provable simply by expert
lawyer testimony or textbooks about the prevailing community
norms of practice. Increasingly the question will be whether the law-
yer was negligent under the circumstances established in the bargain
with the client, a more complex and difficult question to resolve.
A consumer perspective, therefore, will require a reevaluation
of the system of remedies for malpractice. Part of the task will be to
consider both the problem of consumer accessibility to legal forums
151. This problem of neglect, it should be emphasized, is not the focus of the bar's
criticisms of lawyer competence. A consumer perspective, however, should pay attention to
consumer complaints. See, e.g., Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regula-
tion, 1976 Am. B. FouND. REsEARCH J. 917, 967-71; Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Law-
yers' Professional Liability Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980 Am. B. FouND. REsEARcH J.
253, 272.
152. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 1, at 732-34; Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malprac-
tice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTE DAME LAW. 708 (1980); Note, The Illinois
Legal Malpractice Tort.: Basic Tenets and Recent Trends, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 427.
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and the problem of establishing a forum that from the consumer's
view can decide satisfactorily this potential new generation of com-
plicated malpractice claims. These problems can best be approached
in conjunction with the next section, also concerned with enforce-
able remedies for individual consumers of legal services.
D. Monitoring Quality From a Consumer Perspective: Value for
Price
As with remedies for malpractice, the legal profession's ap-
proach to the numerous disputes about lawyers' fees has been inade-
quate. 53 Within the emerging contract model, the question will not
be whether a lawyer ought to be disciplined for the quality of the
performance as measured by a high-quality professional standard,
but rather whether the client got what he or she bargained for.
For example, a client might ask if he or she really did get $1000
worth of advice for a fee of $1000; perhaps the lawyer was lazy, ineffi-
cient, or made mistakes that could have been avoided by better use
of the time that was bargained for. The situation could be termed
malpractice if the advice leads to damages, but other contractual
remedies also should be available. It might be that the client simply
ought to pay less for a particular legal service. Similarly, a client
may object, as many now do, to the number of hours billed for a
particular task that the client requested the lawyer to accomplish.
Again, there should be an efficient contractual remedy for such
overbilling.
As the consumer contract model gains ascendancy, consumers
will have more frequent need for some means to evaluate the profes-
sional product and obtain redress when necessary. Deciding whether
the contractual obligations have been met would be a "deregulated"
way to police the profession. But here too the contract model poten-
tially could make matters worse for the consumer. Although the
traditional professional model in practice may not have worked well
in handling fee disputes, at least the emphasis on uniform standards
of performance may have provided the potential for a coherent sys-
tem of regulation of fee disputes. Under the contract model, the
problem is more difficult because the legal fees cannot simply be
compared to professional norms. They must be considered in rela-
tion to the varying contractual expectations of the parties.
The law could evolve and be applied through adjudication of fee
disputes, just as it now may develop through adjudication of mal-
153. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, supra note 2, at 216-19.
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practice claims. To the extent that fee disputes involve a relatively
small amount of moziey, however, the economic benefits of a judicial
resolution may not outweigh the costs. The problem is compounded
if the client has to prove the claim through expert legal testimony,
which also can be expensive and no doubt can be difficult to obtain.
Furthermore, the factual complexity of these questions of quality
for value make litigation risky at best. In general, the new "rights"
of individual clients realistically cannot be considered enforceable
via the ordinary courts.
Many fee disputes could wind up in more accessible, less formal,
and less expensive small claims courts. Unfortunately, the experi-
ence of small claims courts thus far is not promising.1" 4 The infor-
mality simply may mean that an individual client who knows little
about the law and legal practice Will confront a sophisticated,
knowledgeable lawyer. Conscientious and sympathetic judges may
help even the balance, but the likelihood is that lawyers on the whole
will fare much better than their clients in the small claims court
setting.
There is no question that the new contract regime poses
problems for the consumer seeking quality for value. There also is no
easy solution to the problem of providing remedies at the individual
level. Nevertheless, another possibility, which appropriately has
been gaining more attention, is to look outside the courts to manda-
tory arbitration systems.
Mandatory arbitration of fee disputes, already available in sev-
eral states including California,1 5 offers the virtues of informality,
speed and inexpensiveness. 156 Arbitration panels can develop con-
siderable expertise and help overcome the consumer's lack of legal
sophistication. There clearly is the potential to overcome the most
serious drawbacks of both the ordinary courts and small claims
courts.
Indeed, the California Special Committee on Resolution of Fee
Disputes specifically recommended arbitration to overcome the
problems of a disparity in bargaining power in attorney fee matters
154. See generally Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 102. Small claims courts typi-
cally have had particular difficulty with highly technical claims or defenses, such as those
available under new consumer protection laws. See J. RuHNKA & S. WELLER, SMALL CLAIMS
CouRTs: A NATIONAL EXAMINATION 195-96 (1978).
155. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(b) (West Supp. 1981). See generally Hargarten &
Ardisson, Fine Tuning California's Mandatory Attorney Fee Arbitration Statute, 16 U.S.F.L.
REv. 411 (1982); Alaska's plan is examined in Comment, Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes:
New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. Rsv. 309 (1976).
156. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 1, at 729-36; Rhode, supra note 89, at 718.
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and the lack of any effective civil remedy for the client.III For simi-
lar reasons, the American Bar Association Committee on Resolution
of Fee Disputes has offered a set of model bylaws to encourage man-
datory arbitration. 5-
Consumers still must be wary, however. All of those arbitration
schemes are under the auspices of the bar associations, and they may
not be as aggressive as they should be in furthering consumer rights.
The schemes will depend, after all, on the good will of the members
of the local bars. Lay participants on panels, of course, can help keep
the consumer perspective alive, but the undeniable fact is that con-
sumers have fared poorly to date in virtually all industry-sponsored
schemes for the arbitration of consumer complaints.' 59 Perhaps ex-
perience could prove attorney fee arbitration somewhat different,
but one can doubt whether any of these reforms, desirable as they
may be, will overcome the fundamental inequality between most
lawyers and most clients. Without denying the potential, even if
limited, of reforms enhancing clients' individual remedies, more
global approaches to the overall consumer problem of quality for
value also should be considered.
E. Diversification in Legal Services and Quality Control
Consumers can benefit, with respect to making informed
choices and obtaining value at a given price, from the increasing di-
versification in legal service supply that is emerging from the der-
egulation of the profession. Diversification, however, must be distin-
guished from what usually is referred to as specialization of the legal
profession. ' 6 0 Specialization refers primarily to the availability of
legal services at a quality (and price) higher than that prevailing
among general practice lawyers. It is perfectly consistent with a
high, professionally defined standard of competence generally appli-
cable to lawyers. Indeed, one aspect of such a standard of compe-
tence, however ambiguous it may be in practice, is a duty of the
157. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTION
OF FEE DISPUTES (1976).
158. SPECIAL CoMMITTEE ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION SECTION OF BAR ACTIVITIES, TiE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES: A REPORT AND MODEL
BYLAws (1974).
159. See, e.g., Eaton, The Better Business Bureau: "The Voice of the People in the Mar-
ketplace," in No ACCESS TO LAw 233 (L. Nader ed. 1980).
160. See, e.g., ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYES, supra note 1, at 301-416; R.
ZEHNLE, SPECIALIZATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1975); Laumann & Heinz, Specializa-
tion and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 155.
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general practitioner to refer clients to legal specialists in compli-
cated legal matters.' 6'
Diversification involves product differentiation and consumer
choice. The availability of group and prepaid legal services, price
competition, and advertising, despite some obstacles erected by pro-
fessional organizations, has led inevitably to a diversification in the
professional product.' 62 This diversification offers interesting pos-
sibilities for the consumer seeking a good buy in legal services.' 63
Indeed, if the bar is willing now to recognize diversification and even
embrace it, despite the long tradition favoring at least the ideal of
uniformity in professional services, the consumer can reap some
very clear benefits.
First, diversification in legal services improves the possibilities
for intelligent consumer choice. The consumer can avoid the danger-
ous trap of thinking that all lawyers provide basically the same ser-
vices, which probably was never true. Instead, consumers increas-
ingly will become aware that legal clinics, for example, provide "no
frills" legal services on a relatively impersonalized, high-volume,
low-cost basis,' 64 while large firms generally provide specialized
high-cost, meticulous, individualized legal services. Small law firms,
in turn, might be known for personal contact but not necessarily
premium research.' 65 A consumer who is aware of such differences
will be better able to make a choice as to the general quality of legal
services desired and the price he or she is willing to pay.
Second, diversification offers the possibility of standards for
performance, and even limited regulation, within each type of prac-
tice. 166 Attempts to hold all practitioners to the corporate ideal
would be abandoned. For example, the estimated 600 legal clinics in
the United States 167 . could be held to a standard appropriate for
mass legal services. It is not enough to insist that they handle only
161. CPR DR 6-101(A)(1) already provides that "a lawyer shall not .... handle a
legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without
associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it."
162. See, e.g., AMERicAN BAR AssoCIATION, supra note 79.
163. These differences would refer to types of claims as well as to types of practices.
164. See supra note 81.
165. Murray Schwartz has emphasized the idea of "holistic" lawyering. Schwartz,
supra note 78, at 1283.
166. In a sense, this could imply the breakup of the legal profession into subprofession-
als identified by type of client and practice. Just as licensed psychological counseling is di-
vided, inter alia, into such categories as social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, the
provision of legal advice and representation could be classified by specific categories. Obvi-
ously this could undermine the notion of a single legal profession with the same training and
same status license, but that ideal is difficult to sustain today in any event.
167. See Jenkins, supra note 81.
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"simple" or "routine" matters such as a will or an uncontested di-
vorce. Even in a relatively simple matter, the premium quality law-
yer will uncover the complexities in law and fact applicable to a par-
ticular individual. 6 I The paralegal filling out a form at a legal clinic
cannot be held to that standard. One agenda for researchers and the
bar should be to help develop a realistic approach for evaluating the
quality of innovative mass legal services provided at relatively low
prices. Indeed, there could even be some form of peer review within
the diversified segments of the emerging legal profession.
A prime example of the need for a special set of standards is the
Legal Services Corporation. Despite some official pronouncements
to the contrary, 169 the Legal Services Corporation can best be un-
derstood as an institution that is charged with both "mass delivery"
along the lines of legal clinics and complex "impact" litigation akin
to the work of the large corporate bar.' 7 0 Thus, if the premium, cor-
porate-level performance standards were imposed on all legal ser-
vices work, in practice many fewer cases could be handled and im-
pact work would be slighted.
The quality question with respect to legal services for the poor
in fact involves two problems. First, what should the standard of
performance be for the services provided? Second, who should de-
cide? On the one hand, it can be argued that, consistent with the
informed consent notion described above, only the individual clients
should decide. Marshall Breger's recent thoughtful study of legal aid
points essentially in that direction.' 7 ' Another perspective, how-
ever, would suggest that "client" must be defined more broadly to
include poor persons generally and their legal interests. If that is
true, we should try to allocate decisions about the resources commit-
ted to particular legal services in a way that responds to a broader
constituency. Moreover, it is difficult to use individual informed
consent when the client is not paying. Presumably the informed cli-
ent will want high level services for his or her legal problem.' 72
168. See supra note 50.
169. See, e.g., Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A. J. 1339 (1975).
The Reagan administration, it should be noted, is trying to eliminate the Legal Services Cor-
poration, especially its "impact" work. See, e.g., Drew, A Reporter at Large (Legal Services
Corporation), NEw YORKER, Mar. 1982, at 97.
170. See, e.g., J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE
PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978). The double aims are assumed in the Legal Services Corpo-
ration's treatment and evaluation of alternative models for providing legal services to the
poor. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 130-43 (1980).
171. Breger, Legal Aid For the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.L. REv. 282 (1982).
172. The English judicare legal aid system, which provides legal aid through private
lawyers who are reimbursed by the state, confronts this problem by limiting the client to
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The Legal Services Corporation has dealt with this general
problem in part by requiring that each local program go through a
priority-setting process that educates the client population as to the
problem of limited resources and involves it in the key decisions
about lawyers' priorities.173 In addition, the Corporation recently
has developed a draft, entitled, "Standards for Providers of Civil
Legal Services to the Poor."1 4 The draft provides, in part, that lo-
cal decisions about which issues to pursue should be based on the
client community's judgment regarding which needs are most criti-
cal. I 75 The client community may call for a kind of service that em-
phasizes quantity rather than individualized high quality for certain
kinds of cases, and individual programs should be permitted to
conform.
It might be useful to let the client community elect a standard
which the legal profession explicitly could recognize as applicable
only to mass legal services. Lawyers could then attempt to attain
the highest quality possible within the constraints of high volume
"reasonable" services, meaning "that an applicant should receive aid if a normal private solic-
itor would advise a private client with a similar case and moderate financial means to proceed
with litigation." M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 123, at 94. In other words, for cost reasons the
poor client cannot ask for more than what a hypothetical paying client would obtain. See also
the discussion in Breger, supra note 171.
173. Priority setting is mandated by federal regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 1620. For discus-
sion of how it is conducted, see SYSTEMS FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 4-1 to 4-28 (G. Krech ed.
1980).
174. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF CIVIL LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR (Discussion Draft Dec. 1981); Tull, The Development of Standardsfor
Legal Services: The Continuing Search for Quality, 38 NLADA BRIEFCASE 83 (1981).
175. The draft standards cannot be examined in detail here, but a few comments can be
made. First, the draft seems to insist both on uniform high quality and informed consent,
which is an admirable if unrealistic goal. See STANDARDS OF PROVIDERS OF CIVIL LEGAL SER-
VICES TO THE POOR, supra note 174, Standard 2.3-5. According to the commentary, "[t]he
most serious danger of overloading lawyers or lay advocates is that they will respond by dilut-
ing the quality of services they provide to a point below acceptable standards." Id. at 2-67.
With respect to informed consent, Standard 2.4-2 states that "the client should control the
conduct of each legal matter, determining the objectives sought and strategies adopted, to the
fullest extent permitted by the ethical responsibility of the advocate."
Nevertheless, the draft recognizes that a legal service provider:
cannot reasonably hope to meet all of the needs which exist. Consequently, deliber-
ate planning becomes critically important ...
Planning should be responsive to the competing demands which confront pro-
viders. First, the sheer number of clients with a need for assistance with individual
legal problems requires that a provider adopt a delivery structure which will maxi-
mize its ability to serve as many clients as possible, consistent with its overall objec-
tive. Second, there are a multitude of issues with community-wide impact which
might be addressed. The choice of issues to be undertaken should be based upon the
judgment of the client community regarding which needs are most critical.
Id. at 1-55.
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and relatively little lawyer time involvement. The question of how
to develop quality consistent with the mass provision of services ob-
viously merits considerable attention.
The new pluralism in legal services, in sum, ought to inform a
new agenda for research and evaluation by professional and con-
sumer groups."16 Methods for studying and improving legal clinics,
solo practitioners, legal aid lawyers, and other providers of legal ser-
vices, should be devised free of the effort to find--or at least en-
force-a one-dimensional professional standard. Consumer choice
will be aided considerably by the explicit recognition that here, as
elsewhere, one should expect more in price and quality from a gour-
met store than a "no frills" market.
F. Competence, Organization, and the Bargaining Power of
Consumers
Professionalization, in the words of Christopher Lasch, repre-
sents "the consensus of the competent," and he argues that it "came
into being by reducing the layman to incompetence." ' Put an-
other way, the emergence of specialized knowledge and training
under the auspices of professional organizations made the layman
unable to function in the professional's domain without becoming
dependent on the professional. The consumer perspective, through a
requirement such as informed consent, tries to make clients more
competent to understand legal problems and how they can be han-
dled. The idea is to give clients the tools to reach their own intelli-
gent decisions about what to invest in legal services. Similarly, a
pluralism in identifiable legal service "packages," from corporate
specialist to legal clinic, helps the consumer understand the avail-
able choices.
Even with informed consent and diversification in legal ser-
vices, however, the individual client will be at some disadvantage in
trying to obtain quality at a reasonable price. The individual client
will have problems caused by a lack of bargaining power and a lack
of information when dealing with a particular lawyer or law firm.
The client may be misled, may not be able to evaluate the alterna-
tives, or may even be too much in need of legal services to make the
most favorable contractual bargain.
It is therefore appropriate to consider other ways to improve
176. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 4 (emphasizing the need for research).
177. C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARcIssIsM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISH-
ING EXPECTATIONS 229 (1978).
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the legal competence of the public-in Galanter's terms, to "up-
grade parties."' One obvious possibility is for individuals to join
together to increase their expertise and bargaining power for legal
services. The group can determine what services its members want
and how to monitor those services. It also can bargain collectively
with lawyers who want that business. Indeed, individuals proceed-
ing in this manner began the trend toward accessibility and diversifi-
cation in the early 1960's.I' 9 Since then, there has been an enormous
proliferation of group and prepaid legal services plans. 80
At least with respect to salaried lawyers in closed panel plans,
who must provide services to all qualified members of the plan, qual-
ity control is a basic, if still largely neglected, issue. Pfennigstorf and
Kimball make the point clearly:
Our point, in short, is that closed-panel plans using salaried lawyers can
function only if those attorneys subject themselves and their profes-
sional judgments to restraint in the amount of time and effort to be de-
voted to individual clients and cases. In order to avoid both backlog and
idle time, the natural way is to adjust the time spent on each client ac-
cording to the total number of clients to be served. . . . This is not dif-
ferent from the practice in any law office, except that closed-panel attor-
neys must try to serve all the clients who come to the office ... 181
The sponsors of the plan, whether they admit it or not, elect a given
standard of performance when they determine how many lawyers to
hire and what to pay them.
The possible advantages to consumer members of these plans,
however, go beyond simply the availability of some advice or repre-
sentation at a low price. Here members can monitor the results on
behalf of individuals and the group generally, decide whether more
or less lawyer time needs to be purchased in the interests of their
members, and find out just what realistically can be expected from
lawyers with a particular salary and workload. They will not have to
rely solely on staff lawyers who have an interest in claiming more
pay and in reducing workloads. They also will be able to develop
internal methods for handling complaints by consumers about the
quality of services.
178. See Galanter, supra note 129, at 231.
179. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
180. See, e.g., L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL SERvIcES: SOCIOECONOMIC
IMPACTS (1976); NATIONAL RESouRCE CENTER FOR CONSUMRS OF LEGAL SERvcES, GRoUP
LEGAL SERvIcEs PLANS: ORGANIZATION, OPERATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1981); W. PFEN-
NIGSTORF & S. KIMBALL, supra note 83.
181. W. PFENNiGsTORF & S. KIMBALL, supra note 83, at 156.
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There are promising hints that some plan sponsors have moved
toward such efforts on behalf of their memberships. The United
Auto Worker Legal Plan has had a peer review system for several
years.'8 2 Furthermore, while the National Resource Center for
Consumers of Legal Services reports that quality control has not
developed very far, it emphasizes the issue's importance."8 3
The same principle of upgrading the consumer's knowledge and
bargaining power also emerges with respect to the Legal Services
Corporation and the delivery of legal services to the poor. The effort,
mentioned before, to involve clients in setting priorities for the use
of scarce resources"8 4 constitutes the first step toward empowering
them to choose and monitor the kind and quality of services pro-
vided by a local office. Evidence so far suggests that, despite the ef-
forts to date, staff lawyers still make most basic decisions.1 5 Yet
the idea of monitoring and choice by the client community can help
to promote a consumer perspective in legal services for the poor.
Obviously not all potential clients will participate in self-help
organizations that bargain and monitor on their members' behalf.
Nevertheless, the potential benefits to consumers should not be
overlooked. The consumer's new freedom to take advantage of price
competition and different levels of services may not always lead to a
situation where a good bargain is entered into and carried out effec-
tively in the consumer's interests. It is important, therefore, that
the consumer gain power to bargain successfully through organiza-
tion. To the extent there are remaining professional barriers to such
organizations, consumers will benefit from their elimination. 1 6
G. Education, Training and Professional Competence
This article cannot discuss reforms and issues in legal educa-
tion, 8 ' although they undeniably relate to professional diversity
and quality. It bears reiterating, however, that reforms to improve
knowledge and ability can have a number of different effects. Re-
182. See ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAwYERS, supra note 1, at 293.
183. The National Resource Center suggests that discussion about levels of perform-
ance and the monitoring of quality and results has only begun. A reason given is the lack of
objective professional measures of quality. It is questionable, however, whether the plans can
be aided much by externally developed standards calling for uniform, and costly, high quality.
See NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CoNsurERs OF LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 180, at 92-
93, 153-54.
184. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., B. GARTH, supra note 91, at 206-08.
186. For example, the profession could adopt the liberal view of group legal services
proposed by the Kutak Committee in MODEL RuLEs Rule 5.4.
187. See generally The Law Curriculum in the 1980s, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315 (1982).
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stricting entry to law schools, lengthening legal education, and man-
dating apprenticeship programs, for example, could all improve the
quality of lawyers, but the result would not necessarily help con-
sumers. Among other objections, it is clear that greater restrictions
on the supply of lawyers will have an impact on lawyers' fees and
accordingly on the accessibility of legal services.
Even if educational reforms do not directly raise the cost of le-
gal services, they may fail to address problems in a way likely to
benefit clients. One can imagine, for example, a first class trial advo-
cacy program that teaches all the steps a perfect lawyer would per-
form, but neglects to consider the problem of how a typical lawyer
undertakes those steps in the real world. Lawyers should know how
to do premium work, but professional quality might improve and
consumers might benefit if lawyers also know how best to standard-
ize procedures, utilize assistants and manage a large caseload. As has
been emphasized repeatedly, the profession is not homogeneous;
various levels of services already are being provided and will surely
be provided in the future.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND COMPETENCE IN THE 1980's
In one important sense, leaders of the legal profession are right.
Competence ought to be a vital issue for the legal profession in the
1980's. Consumers are increasingly thrust into the marketplace, and
they cannot count on getting quality for value.
The organized bar, however, has tended to approach the compe-
tence issue from the wrong perspective. The movement to upgrade
competence has not focused on means to help the consumer in a new
era characterized by price competition, and diversity in lawyers and
the kinds of services they provide. Instead, the tendency today, as it
has been in the past, is to favor a collective upgrading effort, consist-
ent with traditional professional values of homogeneity, standard
high-quality services, and professional self-regulation. Lawyers are
supposed to disregard the marketplace and insist on the mainte-
nance of high-quality standards of performance.
Three general criticisms of that effort have been made in this
article. First, it represents a distraction from profound recent
changes in the legal profession, the implications of which are not yet
well understood. Pressures to improve both access1" to lawyers and
188. For a general discussion of reforms promoting access, see Cappelletti & Garth,
Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27
BuWAw L. REv. 181 (1978).
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the rights of consumers to determine their investment in legal ser-
vices have been translated increasingly into the practical deregula-
tion of the profession with respect to price and level of service pro-
vided." 9 This raises many difficult issues beyond the scope of this
article, such as the possible impact on the assumptions of the adver-
sary system, on the ideal of equal justice, and on the independence of
the legal profession. These issues cannot be avoided simply by insist-
ing that all lawyers really should be regulated by the same high stan-
dard of performance.
Second, an overemphasis on competence runs counter to the im-
portant values of access and consumer autonomy, which have
emerged especially in the past two decades. A collective upgrading
effort built on a uniform, high standard of performance will raise the
cost of legal services, thus preventing access, and also will reduce the
consumer's right to determine the appropriate level of investment in
legal services. Individuals gain little when the exaltation of quality
prevents the purchase of varying levels of services.
Third, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, a collective upgrading
effort built on a uniform high standard of performance appears
doomed to failure. 19 0 The changes in the profession are here to stay,
and even a large scale effort to restore the traditional ideal can do
little to turn the clock back. Indeed, an analysis of the profession's
current and proposed codes of professional responsibility clearly
shows that too much emphasis on the requirement of uniform per-
formance is inconsistent with other values contained in the codes.
The values of access and client autonomy are accepted now in codes
of professional responsibility, and they prevent any effort to focus
single-mindedly on upgrading professional performances.
Finally, once we recognize the misdirection of the collective up-
grading effort that purports to make competence the issue of the
1980's, we can begin to ask how to address the problem of lawyer
quality from a perspective consistent with consumer interests and
indeed with the codes of professional responsibility. The traditional
189. While there is no Supreme Court in Great Britain to force the profession to move
more toward price competition and advertising, it is notable that strong pressures are being
placed on the profession. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 76.
190. There is a sense in which "failure" could be successful. Without imputing motives,
from the perspective of professional leaders the perfect "solution" arguably may be an empha-
sis on upgrading sufficient to reassure the public about legal professionalism. If there is too
much emphasis on competence, costs may be raised which would anger the public. The result
then could be the breakdown of the professional monopoly overethe delivery of legal services.
Cf. Rhode, supra note 56. This article has chosen to take the bar leaders seriously, asking what
the implications are of a real effort to upgrade the bar generally through professional
regulation.
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professional model is inadequate. A contract model has emerged,
along with diversity in available legal services, and we must ask how
to protect the consumer in this new setting.
Addressing lawyer competence from a consumer perspective is a
serious challenge. Individual, unorganized consumers lack the
knowledge and bargaining power to make intelligent decisions about
legal services investment. They also are bound to have trouble eval-
uating the results and obtaining effective remedies when lawyers err
or take advantage of them. Nevertheless, several reforms already
being discussed in the profession, such as the further development of
the informed consent doctrine, the improvement of remedies for cli-
ents unhappy with their lawyers, and the encouragement of group
and prepaid plans, do offer some potential. Finally, the debate about
quality can be improved if consumers and the profession recognize
that the nostalgic search for uniform, enforceable standards of high-
quality performance will not provide consumers much assistance in
their efforts to find reasonable quality legal services at a reasonable
price.

